

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

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FINAL RECORD OF THE SIX HUNDRED AND FORTIETH PLENARY MEETING

held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Tuesday, 2 February 1993, at 10 a.m.

President: Mr. Celso Luiz Nunes Amorim (Brazil)

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The PRESIDENT: I declare open the 640th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament.

At the outset I wish to welcome warmly, on behalf of the Conference and on my own behalf, the Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, Ambassador Grigory Berdennikov, who is our first speaker today. Ambassador Berdennikov is a career diplomat, responsible at present for matters relating to arms control and disarmament in the Foreign Ministry. Such a responsibility is the culmination of a long and brilliant career devoted to disarmament, during which he participated in the work of this Conference, as well as in the deliberations of the First Committee of the General Assembly. He left behind many friends in the Conference who, I am sure, are very happy to see him back.

I should also like to extend a warm welcome, on behalf of all of us, to the new representative of Hungary, Ambassador György Boytha, who is attending the plenary meeting for the first time. In doing so, I should also be grateful if he could convey to his predecessor, Ambassador Tóth, our best wishes for success in his new responsibilities. We have very good memories of the work done by Ambassador Tóth, and I am sure that he will continue to serve his country very effectively. May I assure Ambassador Boytha of my cooperation and that of my delegation in our joint endeavours in this Conference?

I wish to inform you that, once the list of speakers is exhausted, I shall put before the Conference the appointment of the chairmen of the ad hoc committees on effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons and on transparency in armaments.

I have on my list of speakers for today the representatives of the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom, Mexico and Germany.

I now give the floor to His Excellency the Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, Ambassador Grigory Berdennikov.

Mr. BERDENNIKOV (Russian Federation) (translated from Russian): Mr. President, first of all allow me to thank you for the kind words addressed to me and in turn offer you my greetings as the representative of the friendly country of Brazil and, through you, all the participants in this unique multilateral forum on disarmament issues and wish you success in your work in this important area of international politics. I should also like to offer greetings to the Secretary-General, of the Conference, Mr. Vicente Berasategui, who plays an important role in the work of this forum.

A fundamental task at the present stage is, in our view, to ensure that the process now under way of deep cuts in the mountains of weapons accumulated during the "cold war" years becomes irreversible, and to establish reliable guarantees that the physical structures for military confrontation will not be re-created, while at the same time strengthening the security of all countries. Perhaps what is most important at present is to ensure the practical implementation of already concluded multilateral, regional and bilateral agreements which form a broad juridical basis for genuine

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disarmament and which cover most though not all of the traditional disarmament agenda as it was drawn up in the 1970s and 1980s. And this is natural, because if all States do not discharge their commitments in this regard in a conscientious and timely manner it will hardly be possible to seriously expect the adoption of even more far-reaching agreements. Moreover, one may discern ever more clearly the outlines of a broad set of complex issues related to the elimination and recycling of weapons released by the cuts, without adverse environmental impacts and at minimal economic cost. Russia stands ready to contribute to tackling these tasks as its abilities permit.

Russia no longer has adversaries identified once and for all on ideological grounds. However, like any other State, we have our national interests which we would like to realize on the basis of cooperation and partnership with all countries ready to do so. We consider that for the realization of these interests we have an important instrument in the Conference on Disarmament, which should in our opinion remain a multilateral negotiating forum in the field of arms control and security. And in this respect the elaboration of the Convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons recently signed in Paris offers indisputable evidence of the vitality of the Conference on Disarmament. The Convention is an outstanding achievement of multilateral diplomacy. It sets unprecedented standards of openness and cooperation in the field of security on a global scale. Practically all States in the world have succeeded in agreeing not only on eliminating chemical weapons as a means of war but also on the destruction of this class of weapon of mass destruction subject to effective international verification. We hope that under this Convention a flexible, effective and not excessively costly international mechanism will be established for its implementation. Our country has been involved with this Convention from the outset and has striven in every way to make it a reality. Having signed the Convention, we recognize the scope of the commitments entered into by Russia. In the difficult economic conditions being experienced by our country we will have to develop an environmentally sound capability to destroy 40,000 tons of CW agents, address economic and social issues and provide employment for people previously in CW-related occupations. We are grateful to those countries which have expressed their readiness to assist Russia in the destruction of chemical weapons and fulfilling other commitments under the Convention.

As of today the Convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons has been signed by more than 130 States. The most important task now is to ensure the genuine universality of the Convention membership in order to make the prohibition of chemical weapons really global. Russia for its part is taking measures through diplomatic channels to achieve this objective.

I think that it is definitely historically appropriate that the Paris ceremony for the signature of the chemical weapons Convention took place just a few days after another important event in the area of disarmament - the signing in Moscow of the START 2 Treaty. Thus the efforts at both multilateral and bilateral levels covering both nuclear and chemical weapons have been crowned with success practically simultaneously. The Moscow Treaty, which provides for the biggest ever reduction of nuclear arsenals - by two-thirds from their present levels - represents a tangible embodiment of the new relations of partnership and cooperation in the field of arms limitation and reduction between yesterday's major political adversaries. Such a view of

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this Treaty is all the more justified as the START 2 Treaty provides not for the mere elimination of strategic arms which have become obsolete, but for the deliberate removal from the arsenals of both sides, or the substantial reduction, of the most destabilizing strategic systems. Thus, one important element of the Treaty relates to the mutual obligations of the parties concerning elimination of the latest American MX "Peacekeeper" ICBM and Russian SS-18 heavy missiles and a substantial (half to two-thirds) cut in strategic nuclear warheads deployed in the naval and airborne components of the strategic triad. The START 2 Treaty also corrects distortions which may have appeared as a result of the implementation of START 1, primarily because of the right stipulated under START 1 not to count the actual number of nuclear armaments on heavy bombers. The provisions of the START 2 Treaty will lead to a situation where all the strategic offensive armaments of the two parties will be counted for the first time. The START 2 Treaty leaves no loopholes for bypassing the counting rules, as it provides for strict verification procedures.

It must also be pointed out that the extent of the cuts in strategic offensive weapons provided for under the new Treaty is not only in keeping with the new international circumstances but is also tailored to Russia's economic capacities. The new Treaty offers proof of the mutual readiness of the parties to take into account one another's economic interests and avoid assuming treaty obligations that would entail unjustified material outlays. Also of key importance for maintaining strategic stability is the intrinsic interrelationship, reaffirmed under the new Treaty, between the implementation of the reductions provided for under START 1 and START 2 and compliance by Russia and the United States of America with their obligations under the ABM Treaty. In the context of deep cuts in strategic offensive weapons being pursued by Russia and the United States of America, the significance of the ABM Treaty becomes even greater. I hope that here at the Conference on Disarmament the efforts aimed at radical nuclear disarmament which we have made together with the United States of America will be properly received, inter alia in the context of the readiness of the nuclear Powers to honour their commitments under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. In this respect I cannot fail to mention the need for Ukraine and Belarus to ratify the START 1 Treaty rapidly and, together with Kazakhstan, to accede to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons as non-nuclear States. Almost a year has passed since, in May 1992, Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Belarus assumed the obligation under the Lisbon Protocol to accede in the shortest possible time to the non-proliferation Treaty as States which did not possess nuclear weapons. Frankly speaking I shall not conceal that we are concerned at the fact that the "shortest possible time" mentioned in the Lisbon Protocol is being stretched out or, hedged about with conditions, as unfortunately is happening in the case of the Ukraine. The START 2 Treaty has intrinsic links with the START 1 Treaty and can only enter into force and be implemented in conjunction with it. Those who, deliberately or not, are now placing new obstacles in the path of the START 1 Treaty and the Lisbon arrangements which form an integral part of it should understand the degree of responsibility they are taking on vis-à-vis the whole of mankind. Both the fate of nuclear disarmament, and the future of the nuclear weapons non-proliferation regime are at stake. This problem concerns all countries without exception.

(Mr. Berdennikov, Russian Federation)

Although the East-West confrontation is gone, the world has not yet entered a state of genuine stability. New challenges to international security have emerged. Among them are regional crises and conflicts of which we unfortunately have direct experience, and the danger that the whole world will be overrun by the most modern and lethal weapons, principally weapons of mass destruction and missiles as well as technologies for their production and so forth. In this context we consider that the United Nations Secretary-General's report entitled "New dimensions of arms regulation and disarmament in the post-cold war era" is timely and useful. As the Conference on Disarmament is due to express its views on the Secretary-General's report soon, I would like to suggest that it should be given active and unambiguous support by this forum. In this respect we would specifically like to highlight such points in the report as the need for the integration of disarmament and arms control issues into the broader structure of the international agenda, the globalization of the disarmament process and further intensification of efforts in this area. We also consider the main points of reference in the area of disarmament as contained in the report, including the nuclear test ban, ensuring transparency in armaments, conversion, etc., to be correct. We also support the emphasis placed in the report of the Secretary-General of the United Nations on the issue of non-proliferation, and we welcome the fact that a process of unofficial consultations on this issue among interested States began last year in the Conference on Disarmament. Non-proliferation is undoubtedly the most important guarantee of, and an indispensable condition for, further deep cuts in nuclear arsenals. The efforts of the international community to curb the spread of weapons of mass destruction will to a great extent determine the development of international relations in the foreseeable future.

Of cardinal importance is the forthcoming 1995 conference on the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, which is to take a decision on extending it. We share the view of the United Nations Secretary-General that there is a need to make this unique document universal and of unlimited duration. For over 20 years since it was adopted the Treaty has proved to be an effective instrument for strengthening international security. The norms embodied in it have received general recognition. Over 150 States are now parties to it. It is important that its membership has been steadily expanding in recent years. In this context we would like to note the accession of France and China to the Treaty, with the result that as of today all the nuclear States have contracted obligations under this treaty. We also welcome the accession of South Africa and other States of the African continent to the Treaty.

This non-proliferation Treaty makes it possible to respond adequately to problems related to the emergence of new States on the territory of a nuclear super-Power - the former USSR. All these countries have declared their support for the non-proliferation Treaty and their readiness to become parties to it. Within the context of the Commonwealth of Independent States support was expressed for the role of Russia as the sole nuclear Power on the territory of the former USSR and as a depositary of the non-proliferation Treaty. We welcome the fact that a number of independent States which were formerly part of the USSR have already officially acceded to the Treaty, and we count on other countries which have not yet done so following suit. I would like to stress once again that the emergence of new nuclear States anywhere would be a blow to this Treaty and to the very foundations of

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strategic and nuclear stability in the world. Russia will make every possible effort to avert such a situation, and we count on interaction with other States parties to the non-proliferation Treaty on this issue. We share the view of the United Nations Secretary-General that "there can be no justification for any State, anywhere, to acquire the tools and technologies of mass destruction". The United Nations Secretary-General was absolutely right to recall that at its meeting in January 1992, attended by the highest State leaders, the Security Council declared that the proliferation of nuclear and indeed all types of weapon of mass destruction constitutes a threat to international peace and security.

Of course, global efforts aimed at non-proliferation should be combined with regional measures. In this context Russia, as one of the co-chairmen of the Middle East settlement process, supports an approach under which all countries of the region would renounce possession of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery. The Conference on Disarmament might also contribute to solving the problem of non-proliferation, both in terms of political points of reference and in solving a number of technical aspects. In particular, we believe that there is a need to analyse the state of affairs in the important issue of security guarantees. In this regard it seems the time has come to make new efforts in order to work out a general formula for negative guarantees. Russia is ready to contribute to this exercise.

It seems to us that new conditions are now beginning to take shape, much more favourable than in the past, for solving one of the key tasks in the field of nuclear disarmament - the prohibition of nuclear testing. Currently three nuclear States, Russia, the United States of America and France, are observing officially declared moratoriums. This fact alone points to the possibility of making progress towards agreement on a test ban. We also believe that in the very near future all the nuclear States will be able to give definite support to a start to negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament on the prohibition of the nuclear weapon testing. As for Russia, we are ready for such negotiations. We also believe that special contacts on the issue are warranted among the five nuclear Powers. Therefore we support the proposal made by France last November that the representatives of these States in the Conference on Disarmament should take up the joint consideration of these issues. In our opinion experience with the negotiations on chemical weapons demonstrates the possibility of combining multilateral, bilateral and other forms of negotiations in the framework of the Conference on Disarmament in the best possible way. One of the guarantees that a new nuclear arms race will not be unleashed is our proposed arrangement concerning a verifiable ban on the production of fissionable materials for weapons purposes, which would go a long way towards solving the problem of the irreversibility of nuclear disarmament.

Multilateral efforts to prevent the arms race in outer space still remain a priority area in the activities of the Conference on Disarmament. The most promising first step would be efforts to agree upon measures for confidence-building, transparency and predictability in States' activities in outer space. I think we can already talk about the development of a concrete multilateral arrangement on this issue, which in our opinion would be in the interests of all.

(Mr. Berdennikov, Russian Federation)

As you know, the Russian delegation actively supported efforts to add the new issue of transparency in armaments onto the agenda of the Conference. The consideration of this topic at the Conference on Disarmament and the United Nations General Assembly stems from the growing importance of the problems of conventional arms cuts, confidence-building measures and the settlement of regional conflicts. We view transparency in armaments as an important confidence-building measure, a means to strengthen security and remove mutual concerns and misunderstandings. We intend to provide data for the United Nations register on this topic, and to participate actively in discussing transparency problems here in the Conference, which we regard as the most appropriate forum to this end. Bearing in mind the novelty and the profundity of the transparency problem, the diversity and complexity of its component elements, we believe it is worth while first of all to determine more precisely the scope of tasks to be tackled under this agenda item and to establish an order of priorities for addressing them.

In conclusion I should like to say some words concerning the Conference on Disarmament itself. We support the view of the United Nations Secretary-General that the time has come to proceed from exploratory discussions on the reform of the Conference to practical actions. The Conference, in our view, should acquire greater flexibility, which would allow it on the one hand to concentrate efforts on well-defined and urgent issues, and on the other to diversify its methods and forms of operation in the light of the tasks which life itself places before it. In the future the Conference might evolve into a sort of "umbrella forum" under the aegis of which multilateral negotiations might be conducted on disarmament and confidence-building measures with flexibility in determining who would participate in specific negotiations. In particular we should seriously consider the possibility of using the potential of the Conference to solve certain regional problems in the field of security and disarmament. The idea of establishing an international disarmament organization under United Nations auspices is still an important one.

Of course, one of the most important issues in the Conference on Disarmament is the issue of its membership. In principle we see no reason which would prevent the Conference from becoming a universal multilateral body. However, we are ready not to press matters, and we suggest at this stage agreeing on a substantial - about 50 per cent - expansion in the membership of the Conference. Such a decision would make it possible to satisfy the legitimate interest of many States in full-fledged participation in the work of the Conference, an interest which they demonstrated by applying for membership. The practical implementation of these largely unconventional concepts in their entirety might require some time, but consideration of them should begin today, not be postponed for tomorrow. The forthcoming session of the First Committee of the United Nations General Assembly in March might be a proper place for reviewing the first results of such discussions. We would like to hope that the intellectual and expert potential to be found in the Conference on Disarmament will be tapped to the fullest extent in this as in other areas of interaction between States.

The PRESIDENT: I thank His Excellency the Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation for his important statement and for the kind words he addressed to me and to my country. I also take the liberty to thank

(The President)

him on behalf of the Secretary-General, Ambassador Berasategui. I now give the floor to the representative of the United Kingdom, Ambassador Sir Michael Weston.

Sir Michael WESTON (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland): At the outset, Mr. President, let me add to the many congratulations you have received since your assumption of the presidency of the Conference on Disarmament. I wish you well in the tasks ahead of you. I would also like to extend my delegation's welcome to the recent new arrivals in the CD. We look forward to working with them in the future.

I have asked for the floor today to set out, in summary form, my delegation's present thinking on the future of the CD and, in particular, the issues of its membership and agenda. What I say must inevitably sound rather parochial after Mr. Berdennikov's important statement. I crave your indulgence. At least I can promise to be brief.

The CD is at a crossroads. It had successfully concluded negotiations on the chemical weapons Convention. It now needs to decide on its future. A process of self-examination has begun, and agreement has been reached that attention should be focused on its improved and effective functioning and in particular on the questions of its membership and agenda. The decision of the United Nations General Assembly covering the resumed session of the First Committee requests the Conference to convey to the Chairman of the First Committee the status of its ongoing review of its agenda, composition and methods of work by 20 February. It may be difficult to reach firm decisions by that date, but we should try. Meanwhile, it is clearly important for members of the CD to develop substantive ideas, so that a real contribution can be made to the First Committee's overall reassessment.

The first question to be asked is whether there is life for the CD after the conclusion of the CWC. Is there a role for the CD, if there are no treaties or agreements of the nature or scale of the nuclear non-proliferation Treaty, the chemical weapons Convention or the biological weapons Convention to be negotiated in the near future, and all weapons of mass destruction are now either restricted or banned by one of the existing treaty regimes? Such questions should not be dismissed out of hand. The CD does have to justify its existence. For our part, however, the United Kingdom recognizes the value of having a framework in place for the negotiation of instruments of disarmament. The advantages of the Conference had included its relatively small and balanced membership and its rule of consensus. I will turn to the question of membership in a moment. But the rule of consensus is, in the United Kingdom's view, vital and must be preserved. This should not, however, preclude the search for new ways to increase the CD's efficiency. The CD should also be open to new ideas which may emerge from the resumed session of the First Committee.

Consultations on the future agenda and membership of the CD have already begun and will occupy a good deal of our time over the coming weeks. In the United Kingdom's view, these issues should be approached in a structured way. We believe that it would be a mistake to revise the agenda and then to admit new members who would have had no opportunity, at least formally, to participate in the decisions on that agenda. If we wish to inject new life into the Conference, any new members should be able to participate fully in

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discussions and decisions on its future from the earliest possible date. Indeed, some of the ideas put forward on the CD's future role cannot be properly assessed until the future membership position is clear. Some indeed may not be feasible at all if membership remains limited - for example the United Nations Secretary-General's idea, expressed in the "New dimensions" report, that the CD could be considered as a permanent review and supervisory body for some existing multilateral arms regulation and disarmament agreements. A short- or long-term solution on membership should therefore be reached as quickly as possible, so that the expanded membership can decide for itself on the future direction of the Conference.

My delegation does not see a direct relationship between size and efficiency - or size and inefficiency. Big may not always be beautiful. But small may not always be efficient. Expanding the CD's membership is not necessarily incompatible with the consensus rule, nor will it necessarily affect the Conference's efficiency and effectiveness. If necessary, smaller subgroups might be created, for specific negotiating tasks. And there can be no doubt that the more countries who have the opportunity to take part in negotiating a treaty or convention, the greater the chances that the resulting text will be universally acceptable.

The United Kingdom is sympathetic to the idea of letting in all those who apply to join. The main advantage of this suggestion is that it is fair. Nobody interested in participating would be left out, and only those with a genuine interest would participate. We believe that there are various ways to achieve this, without damaging the CD. One way would be to set a time-limit for applications, and at the same time to agree to review the situation again in, say, five years' time. We could in addition ask all existing members to confirm by a certain date that they wish to continue their membership of the CD. Another possibility would be to admit initially those States who have already applied and then, with their participation, take the longer-term decisions on the Conference's future agenda and membership.

Some have argued for a more limited expansion. Some indeed have argued against any expansion at all. We share their concern for the efficiency of the CD as negotiating body, but we believe that experience of multilateral negotiation in other fields has shown that it is possible to operate by consensus with a considerably larger membership than that of the CD today.

As I have said, we believe that formal decisions on the future agenda of the Conference should not be taken until the membership position is clarified. Meanwhile, however, we see advantage in continuing informal discussions on the agenda. Building on the idea put forward last year by our former Swedish colleague, Ambassador Hyltenius, for a merger of agenda items 2 and 3 and 6 and 8 under the heading "Other nuclear issues and new types of weapons of mass destruction", we might aim for an agenda with three main clusters: first, nuclear issues and other weapons of mass destruction; secondly, conventional weapons, transparency and confidence-building measures; and, thirdly, existing agreements. A number of sub-items might then be listed under these clusters, and taken up as and when appropriate. For instance, work done under the heading of transparency and confidence-building might include the negotiation of a standard framework for regional confidence-building measures, and the drafting of an annual declaration of the size and organization of military forces to complement the existing return on military budgets.

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The heading "existing agreements" reflects Dr. Boutros-Ghali's idea that the CD could be considered as a permanent review and supervisory body for some existing multilateral arms regulation and disarmament agreements. CD members not party to the said agreements have, of course, no formal entitlement to participate in their review or supervision - and to change that would be to discourage greater adherence to those agreements. But work on supervising or reviewing existing agreements might be carried out by individual sub-committees, each consisting only of those members who are also party to the agreement concerned. Ideally, of course all CD members would in due course become parties to all the relevant agreements and thus be able to participate fully in all such work.

These are just a few thoughts on these two important issues. I hope they will help to stimulate the debate over the next few weeks.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of the United Kingdom, Sir Michael Weston, for his statement and for the kind words addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the representative of Mexico, Ambassador Marín Bosch.

Mr. MARIN BOSCH (Mexico) (translated from Spanish): The delegation of Mexico welcomes the prompt manner in which the Conference on Disarmament has begun its work this year. Once again we congratulate you, Mr. President. Our greetings go to Deputy Minister Berdennikov of the Russian Federation. We welcome our new colleague from Hungary and we wish Ambassador Tibor Tóth all the best.

It is not our intention to take the floor every fortnight in plenary. However, we are doing so today in response to your appeal to delegations to give their views on the report by the Secretary-General entitled "New dimensions of arms regulation and disarmament in the post-cold-war era" (document A/C.1/47/7). In accordance with its decision A/47/422, the General Assembly invites Member States to submit their views on the Secretary-General's report. It also asks the CD to make recommendations about its future by 15 February 1993 and finally it asks this Conference to provide information about the status of its ongoing review of its agenda, composition and methods of work.

It should be remembered that the basis of the prevailing international disarmament strategy was decided by common agreement by the Members of the United Nations during the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, held from 23 May to 1 July 1978. The Final Document of that meeting includes an introduction to the topic of disarmament, a declaration (objectives and purposes), a programme of action (procedures to monitor compliance with obligations entered into) and a section on machinery, deliberations and negotiations for international disarmament (to deal with disarmament problems in their various aspects). The priorities laid down in the 1978 Final Document have not changed. What is more, no member of the international community can deny the validity of the objectives and purposes set forth in the declaration. All of them are enshrined in the United Nations Charter and all of us have recognized them. The dramatic changes that have occurred in international relations in recent years, far from undermining the validity of the Final Document, create conditions more conducive to ending the arms race. As is stated in paragraph 3 of the aforementioned document:

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"Progress on détente and progress on disarmament mutually complement and strengthen each other". It is true that the cold war hampered the proper implementation of the provisions of the 1978 document. But at this time of renewed opportunity, it is necessary not only to confirm its objectives and principles but also to revitalize some aspects of the programme of action and the disarmament machinery.

In order to revitalize the programme of action and the machinery for putting it into practice, it is necessary to follow a procedure similar to that of 1978, in which all - I repeat, all - Member States of the United Nations participate and jointly decide. In disarmament it is not possible to disregard the principles and rules that have been the outcome of a long series of efforts made from the very beginning of the Organization. As with other important issues for the international community, one cannot look only at recent events in evaluating a given situation; instead, they must be viewed from a historical angle. Pragmatism in this topic is only a partial approach in judging situations. The action proposed in "An agenda for peace (preventive diplomacy, peace-making and peace-keeping)" (document A/47/277) should not be seen as an end in itself but as a major complement to the disarmament process, which will help achieve more lasting agreements. We all know that the fundamental problem has been the lack of political will on the part of some States to commit themselves to a real disarmament process, particularly nuclear disarmament. And this is precisely the sphere where, ineluctably, progress must be made if we seek a safer world.

Disarmament, as we have understood it in the United Nations, covers prevention, limitation, reduction and elimination of arms. In negotiating each of these aspects, account has been taken of the political processes that shape international behaviour, which until the end of the cold war prevented any significant advances. The approach suggested by the Secretary-General, focusing the operations proposed in "An agenda for peace" to resolve localized conflicts, may lead to negotiations on all aspects of disarmament in an equally localized fashion, and there may be a risk of arriving at very different results in different regions. Asymmetry in the commitments secured might, translated to the international level, create greater problems unless similar obligations and responsibilities are secured for all States. A pragmatic approach to disarmament makes it impossible to tackle basic problems (as in the case of military doctrines) and may give rise to actions to treat the symptoms rather than the disease. What is termed the use of disarmament measures within the framework of peace enforcement calls for prior agreement on such measures.

The Final Document of 1978 says that "bilateral and regional disarmament negotiations may also play an important part and could facilitate negotiations of multilateral agreements in the field of disarmament" (para. 121). The globalization of disarmament must be the sum of bilateral, regional and multilateral efforts, with participation by all States as appropriate. Globalization must be construed in the sense that all States must undertake to implement disarmament measures and agreements. The argument that the major military Powers must initiate the process and show an example is still valid. The role of the Security Council in maintaining peace and international security is set forth in the United Nations Charter. This role, however, must be seen in the context of the world of the twenty-first century, and therefore the current membership of the Council must be made more democratic. Proposals

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to allow allegedly humanitarian interference in the internal affairs of a State must also be looked at thoroughly and in the light of the above considerations.

Confidence-building measures are without a doubt an important element for international security and must be promoted at every level. Globalization must be taken to mean that all States must undertake to implement them. However, it is the major military Powers that must show an example, in the first place by accepting globalization, without delaying its implementation. The system of agreements and treaties inherited from the cold war period, among them the Final Document of 1978, provides a solid framework for making progress with the disarmament process. The challenge today is not only to put that inheritance into practice, but to supplement the negotiating effort on weapons of mass destruction. Nuclear technology cannot be uninvented, but the production of nuclear weapons can and must be banned. There must also be a halt to the qualitative improvement of existing arsenals. The complete elimination of nuclear weapons remains a priority objective for the international community. The gradual reduction of the number and yield of nuclear tests is an approach that has been proved to be ineffective. It would be a shame to miss the opportunity to ban testing completely, at a time when circumstances are so conducive. We must make this a short-term objective.

We agree that "there can be no justification for any State, anywhere, to acquire the tools and technologies of mass destruction" (para. 27 of document A/C.1/47/7). The way to transform the theory of non-proliferation into concerted action is by making it truly universal and genuine. The ban must also include the nuclear-weapon States. For a non-proliferation system to work, all States everywhere must cease to acquire and further develop the tools and technologies of mass destruction. The provisions of the non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) must be seen in the proper light, without overlooking the intentions of those who wrote it. Indefinite and unconditional extension of the NPT could be arrived at after ensuring that the purposes of the preamble and the provisions of the Treaty are being implemented. If this is not the case, we must keep open the option of evaluating compliance with the Treaty, especially compliance by the nuclear-weapon States, before committing ourselves for ever to its provisions. Consequently, the 1995 conference will have to combine the five-year review of the NPT with discussion on its extension. The preparatory process must include discussions on the substance of the issue of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction in general, as well as the provisions of the Treaty in particular. A 10-year or 15-year extension, together with a nuclear disarmament programme to be completed in that time scale, would prevent any diminution of the already only slight pressure that non-nuclear-weapon States can bring to bear in the nuclear sphere. The preparatory process for the 1995 NPT conference must also include a dialogue among all States, whether or not they are parties to the Treaty. This will ensure that the basis will be laid for better understanding among all concerned on the main elements of a future universal regime for genuine non-proliferation. Disarmament must continue to be focused on nuclear disarmament, for the very reason that progress in that sphere will open the way to other agreements on other types of weapon. The United Nations must continue to have a central role in disarmament. While it is true that there are new circumstances that must be dealt with, the priorities have not changed. Notable among the new circumstances are the question of destruction

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and storage of weaponry and the conversion of military capabilities for peaceful purposes once the disarmament and arms limitation agreements of recent years have been implemented. These matters are of concern to everyone because they stand between environmental issues and considerable economic adjustments, as the Russian delegation reminded us this morning. However, not all States bear the same responsibility, since the developing countries will only suffer the consequences. The question of conversion would be one of the tasks that the Security Council might follow closely.

The need for a single multilateral negotiating forum on disarmament remains. The Conference on Disarmament must be maintained as such. Experience has shown the difficulties that a negotiating body faces when it has a broad membership, particularly when it works by consensus. The Conference on Disarmament, with almost 40 members, has already reached the limit as a negotiating body. The fundamental problem of membership lies in the fact that if we reconsider the characteristics of the countries that should be members of the Conference, in the light of the new international situation, it is clear that there are some that perhaps should not be here while not all those that should be here are here. The reduction of tension in Europe and the disappearance of East/West military confrontation give us a new outlook on the political balance that is needed. A couple of years ago, on 22 January 1991, my delegation gave a historic overview of how the membership of the CD had evolved since 1962. We will have to reconcile two elements: maintaining the limited size and ensuring representativeness of members.

Taking up another point, the agenda of the Conference on Disarmament should continue to reflect priorities in the field of disarmament. We should avoid unnecessary changes and seek to give the items a proper focus. Concentrating on well-defined and urgent matters is an objective that is not at variance with the nature of the CD.

Existing disarmament agreements have their own mechanisms for review and control. In order for the Conference on Disarmament to include those tasks as well, its membership would have to coincide with that of the agreements under review. The CD has run into this difficulty every time it has tried to deal with international agreements that are not of interest to some members. The Secretariat of the United Nations must be strengthened in the disarmament sphere so that it can respond appropriately to the mandates given it by the General Assembly. Tasks have considerably increased and, far from its operations having been strengthened, the level of importance has been downgraded. In 1978 it was agreed to raise the head of the Department for Disarmament Affairs to the rank of Under-Secretary-General, thereby making it independent of the Under-Secretary-General for political and security affairs. After having been a department headed by an Under-Secretary-General, it has again become an office for disarmament coming under a Director-General at a relatively lower level. The professional staff has also been considerably reduced. This situation places this office in a lower position than in 1978.

In short, it is clear that the new international circumstances demand that the United Nations should act in a very different fashion from that which we have been used to seeing during the cold war. But it is also obvious that any change in the elements agreed in 1978 calls for a similarly unanimous decision by the members of the United Nations. We cannot - and I repeat what

(Mr. Marín Bosch, Mexico)

we said a few weeks back - twist the agreements already reached in this sphere for the sake of alleged pragmatism. Certainly pragmatism does not appear among the principles enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations. Neither can the United Nations be asked to play an ever greater role in solving political and military problems while at the same time cuts are made in the Department for Disarmament Affairs. What is more, as experience has shown recently in several countries in what used to be the Warsaw Pact, the application of disarmament agreements is no easy matter and calls for experts as well as money. What would be ideal, of course, would be to convene a new special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. However, the preparatory work for such a session might be lengthy, and the current imperatives rule out any excessive delay in collective decision-making. Hence the decision to resume the work of the First Committee of the General Assembly for a week next March. To ensure the success of the work of the First Committee in this area, it would be desirable to have the views of the greatest possible number of countries, as well as the reports of the Conference on Disarmament. In addition, we should have before us a simple table showing the posts there were, those there are, and those there will be in the Department for Disarmament Affairs of the Secretariat of the United Nations. This would facilitate consideration of this matter in the First Committee. Given the scope of the subject and the little time that the First Committee will have in March, it might be advisable to ask the Chairman of that Committee, Ambassador Nabil Elaraby, to continue consultations, even after the end of the General Assembly's forty-seventh regular session, so as to achieve the broadest possible agreement among all the members of the General Assembly.

The PRESIDENT: I thank Ambassador Marín Bosch for his thought-provoking statement. I now give the floor to the representative of Germany, Ambassador Hoffmann.

Mr. HOFFMANN (Germany): At the beginning of my first formal intervention in this Conference I should like to say that it gives me particular pleasure to see you, Ambassador Amorim, as the President of the CD. With decisions taken recently under your leadership on the beginning of the substantive work of the CD and the nomination of special coordinators you contributed considerably to a new CD after the CW Convention. I congratulate you on these achievements and wish you similar success during the remaining time in office. It also gives me great pleasure to welcome my new neighbour to my left, and it is very nice to greet a newcomer already in my third week in Geneva.

The reason for my taking the floor today is the report of the Secretary-General of the United Nations entitled "New dimensions of arms regulation and disarmament in the post-cold-war era". I should like to comment on some aspects of this report having in mind that the report covers such a variety of issues that it appears to be too ambitious to deal with it as a whole in one plenary statement - and I cannot even promise to be brief.

Germany considers the Secretary-General's report particularly relevant and timely as it initiates the discussion on the future role of arms control and disarmament in a changed political environment. The changes in the international political environment create new challenges for peace and security. Thus, following our own positive experiences in the past, we suggest that arms control and disarmament should play an even more important

(Mr. Hoffmann, Germany)

role on the bilateral, subregional, regional and global level of international relations. In this context, the role of the United Nations and their forums dealing with arms control and disarmament should be to initiate, to encourage, to support and to carry out respective activities whenever needed.

In our view, there are two areas of high priority for fostering international peace and security through the means of arms control and disarmament: the prevention of armed conflicts and the issue of non-proliferation of weapons and related technologies. Let me start with the issue of preventing armed conflicts.

Unfortunately, after the end of the East-West confrontation the temptation to use military means in conflicts has been growing. The increase of peace-making, peace-keeping and peace-building operations of the United Nations bear witness to this development. Arms control and disarmament has the potential to prevent military conflicts. It is for this reason that we consider arms control and disarmament to be of particular importance in the new political environment and an indispensable element of preventive diplomacy.

Arms control and disarmament can develop norms and instruments, to be used by members of the United Nations and the Security Council, to survey and whenever necessary to restore security and stability in a region long before the outbreak of a military conflict. For example, armed forces, their size, equipment and training pattern can serve as indicators of peaceful or non-peaceful intentions. Thus, criteria on armed forces could be developed to identify any arms build-up by one State or any arms race between several States exceeding the needs for self-defence.

For universal application, such criteria could be developed in general terms. However, as additional specific criteria would be needed for any particular situation, general criteria would have to be complemented by countries on a subregional or regional level. The existence of universally agreed criteria would serve as an incentive to subregions and regions to invest in such a complementary work. Ceilings for particular arms or the armed forces required for self-defence could be established, in accordance with regional conditions, and thus promote self-restraint in the acquisition of arms or in sustaining armed forces. Thus, such arms control provisions could contribute to substantive disarmament in the conventional field and, at the same time, become an important element in the overall efforts of the international community to maintain peace. Accumulations of arms in excess of such criteria could serve as early-warning indicators to the region concerned as much as to the international community as a whole

For example, the Security Council could take action on the basis of articles 34, 39 and 41 of the Charter of the United Nations by making first a specific request for information to a particular country on its armed forces or armaments, using criteria and provisions developed in arms control forums. Thus, an excessive arms build-up could be identified in accordance with internationally agreed criteria. This would provide a solid basis for any further action by the Security Council. It is in this field that we see new opportunities for the Security Council in preventing military conflicts by using the means of arms control. We are convinced that these few ideas on how arms control and disarmament can contribute to preventing armed conflicts are

(Mr. Hoffmann, Germany)

only a starting-point. If taken up by the international community and dealt with in the appropriate arms control forums - this Conference is certainly one of them - a whole system of arms control and disarmament provisions could be developed which would significantly contribute to maintaining international peace.

My second priority item, non-proliferation, has been on the international agenda for a long time; encouraging progress has been made. However, more has to be done. Let me start with the issue of non-proliferation related to weapons of mass destruction before addressing conventional weapons. In our view, to prevent proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, the three universally accepted legal instruments, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the BW Convention and the CW Convention, form a solid basis to build upon. However, the starting-point for all non-proliferation efforts is universal adherence to these instruments. In the case of the NPT, only recently a number of important countries became parties to the Treaty. Nevertheless, some countries have not yet decided to join the overwhelming majority of States; others, like some new CIS States, have not yet carried out their commitments to accede to the NPT in the shortest possible time. We encourage all States who have not yet done so to sign and ratify the NPT before the 1995 NPT review conference.

The handling of superfluous nuclear material is another issue which has come up in the context of nuclear disarmament between the United States and the Russian Federation and as a consequence of the break-up of the former Soviet Union. Safe storage, transportation and destruction of nuclear weapons and weapons material earmarked for elimination present one of the greatest challenges of current arms control activities related to non-proliferation. In order to prevent proliferation from countries owning nuclear weapons to be destroyed, cooperation in safety and security matters and in the safe and environmentally responsible elimination of these weapons is one of the high-priority tasks. In this context, inter alia, efforts to strengthen IAEA mechanisms should continue.

Turning now to the BW Convention, it also does not yet enjoy full universal adherence. The most important task ahead is to enlarge its support and to increase its participation level. Furthermore, the 1991 BWC review conference agreed to ask States parties to submit certain data as a confidence-building measure. The international community should recognize that this first step towards a BWC verification regime needs support. This would also increase the credibility of ongoing activities to identify and examine further verification measures for the BW Convention. We feel fully committed to this process of improving the verification provisions of the BW Convention.

To achieve the total elimination of chemical weapons, we all made a great step forward in 1992. We are encouraged by the broad participation of States in the signing ceremony in Paris in January 1993. We hope for early ratification by all signatories. At the same time we earnestly hope that Arab countries that have not yet signed the CW Convention will soon join the overwhelming majority of States. While we agree that any decision in this context must be taken in view of national security considerations, we have difficulties to understand how one can ask for a zone free of weapons of mass

(Mr. Hoffmann, Germany)

destruction in the Middle East on the one side, a goal we fully support, and on the other side miss the opportunity to rid, as a first step, the Middle East region from chemical weapons.

Talking now about proliferation or non-proliferation of conventional weapons we must recognize the legitimacy of conventional weapons. The transfer of arms and related technologies, however, may create problems if weapons and technologies acquired exceed the needs for self-defence and establish capabilities for aggression. Germany is deeply concerned about the growing concentration of conventional weapons in certain regions of the world as well as about certain transfers of weapons, which could lead to a destabilization of entire regions. In our view, therefore, international action is required in order to establish a regime of internationally accepted and implemented restraint in exports and imports of conventional arms, particularly in situations of tension and conflict. Such international action should cover the following areas: transparency in all transfers of conventional arms and related technologies; agreement on common principles for the transfer of conventional arms and related technologies; and development of procedures to prevent or even redress regional instabilities created by excessive arms build-ups.

With the adoption of resolution 46/36 L, a universal and non-discriminatory register of conventional arms has been established. This is a first and important step towards more transparency in the transfer of conventional arms. Germany is committed to provide data as required; we hope for large and equally unconditional participation from countries around the world. As a follow-up, after worldwide participation is emerging, we hope for further steps towards an expansion of the register and towards closer international cooperation with a view to self-restraint in arms transfers. However, transparency in transfers of conventional arms and related technologies is not an end in itself, as the distinguished Ambassador from India rightly pointed out a few days ago. Instead, its political value emerges when it can give assurance to countries concerned at the subregional and regional level that arms transfers are carried out only in accordance with the needs for self-defence. I mentioned some ideas on the furthering of this goal before, and I am confident other members of the CD will take up this issue in order to add their own ideas.

As I said at the beginning of my intervention, the report of the Secretary-General covers a complexity of issues. I have commented only on a few of them; however, as the draft of the CD reply will be discussed in this forum, I reserve the right for my delegation to add further comments.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Germany for his important statement and for the very kind words he addressed to me. I might add, however, that whatever achievement we have made was the result of collective sense of commitment and goodwill. Further success will depend on the same factors as well as on the spirit of compromise we can collectively display.

That concludes my list of speakers for today. Does any other delegation wish to take the floor at this stage? I see the representative of Hungary.

Mr. BOYTHA (Hungary): Mr. President, I just want to thank you for the kind words with which you introduced me to the Conference, and I am obliged to

(Mr. Boytha, Hungary)

the distinguished speakers of today's plenary for their friendly response to this introduction. I thank you for the confidence you extended to me and I appreciate, in particular, the tribute you so kindly paid to my predecessor, Ambassador Tibor Tóth, for the work he has done here over the past years. I would like to assure you, Ambassador Amorim, and all members of the Conference that I and my expert colleagues will do our best in order to continue the active participation of Hungary in the CD work as has been the case over the past years, and I wish you continued success in presiding over this Conference.

The PRESIDENT: I thank Ambassador Boytha and I am sure that we can count on the continued active and intelligent participation of the Hungarian delegation in this plenary.

I wish now to turn to another subject. As I indicated earlier, the consultations have now concluded on the appointment of the chairmen of the ad hoc committees on effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons and on transparency in armaments. Accordingly, we shall proceed now to the relevant decisions. I propose as Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on Effective International Arrangements to Assure Non-nuclear-weapon States against the Use or Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons, Ambassador Romulus Neagu of Romania.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT: I now put before you the appointment of Ambassador Kia Tabatabaee of the Islamic Republic of Iran as Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on Transparency in Armaments.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT: I extend to the two chairmen of the ad hoc committees my congratulations on their appointment and wish them success in the performance of their duties.

In connection with our plenary meeting on Thursday, may I recall that in consultation with the coordinators we agreed to start it at 10.30 a.m? The first speaker will be Her Excellency the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Sweden, Baroness Margaretha at Ugglas.

That concludes our work for today, and I intend now to adjourn this plenary meeting, but before doing so, I wish to remind you that immediately after this plenary meeting, informal open-ended consultations will be held with the aim of having a preliminary exchange of views on the Secretary-General's report "New dimensions of arms regulation and disarmament in the post-cold-war era". Since, after consultations, I heard no objections to the participation of non-members in that meeting, I would like to invite them to attend. The informal consultations will take place in this room in about five minutes.

The next plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament will be held on Thursday, 4 February, at 10.30 a.m.

The meeting rose at 11.30 a.m.

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/PV.641

4 February 1993

ENGLISH

FINAL RECORD OF THE SIX HUNDRED AND FORTY-FIRST PLENARY MEETING

held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Thursday, 4 February 1993, at 10.30 a.m.

President:

Mr. Celso Luiz Nunes Amorim

(Brazil)

The PRESIDENT: I declare open the 641st plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament.

As first order of business, I take pleasure in extending a warm welcome, on behalf of the Conference and on my own behalf, to Her Excellency the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Sweden, Baroness Margaretha af Ugglas, who is addressing the Conference today. The Minister has had an outstanding parliamentary career. She has also held several high positions in the field of international relations, such as member of the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs of the Swedish Parliament, delegate to the Council of Europe and observer to the European Parliament. In addition, she has served as spokesperson for Foreign Affairs of the Moderate Party and as Chairman of the Swedish section of the European Union of Women. She has also had important responsibilities in the field of journalism. The Minister took up her present position on 4 October 1991. Her statement today, during her first visit to the Conference, will undoubtedly be an important contribution to our work.

I have on my list of speakers for today the representatives of Sweden, Poland, Indonesia, Argentina, Cuba, the United States and Brazil. I now give the floor to Her Excellency the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Sweden, Baroness Margaretha af Ugglas.

Baroness af UGGLAS (Sweden): Allow me at the outset to welcome you, Mr. Ambassador, as President of this Conference and wish you all success. As always, you can count upon the full support and cooperation of Sweden in your important task. I also want to pay tribute to Ambassador Berasategui, the Secretary-General of the Conference.

After the cold war, the main threat to mankind is no longer a massive confrontation between two heavily armed nuclear Powers. Today, the proliferation of weapons - in particular weapons of mass destruction - constitutes a growing challenge to international peace and security. Another fundamental shift is that security is no longer considered an exclusively military matter. We now apply a broader concept, linking security with ethnic, economic, social and ecological problems, and the complex relations between them. This concept of security has been central to the development of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. It has also been emphasized in the recent report of the United Nations Secretary-General, entitled "New dimensions of arms regulation and disarmament in the post-cold-war era". Let me put it this way. The international community will have to deal with two categories of security issues: the first category primarily consisting of "traditional" military security issues; the second category comprising non-military security threats related to economic, ethnic, social and ecological problems. While security will always have a military dimension, we can now devote more attention to the non-military dimensions of security than we could in the past, and deal with international problems at their source.

The recent drastic reductions in strategic nuclear arsenals constitute a watershed in the post-war history of disarmament and arms control. The conclusion of the START II agreement confirms the political courage and

(Baroness af Ugglas, Sweden)

determination of the United States and Russia in eliminating the most destabilizing class of strategic weapons - multiple-warhead intercontinental ballistic missiles. However, the START agreements will not be complete without the adherence of all the nuclear Powers which were formerly part of the Soviet Union. In Lisbon last May, the four members of the Commonwealth of Independent States which have nuclear weapons on their territories - Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia and Ukraine - agreed with the United States to carry out the provisions of START I.

In addition to assuming their responsibilities under START I, Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Belarus are committed under the Treaty to the elimination of all nuclear weapons from their territories within the seven-year reduction period. The United States Congress and the parliaments of the Russian Federation and Kazakhstan have consented to the ratification of START I. My Government urges the parliaments of Ukraine and Belarus to take similar action. We also urge Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine to accede without further delay to the non-proliferation Treaty, as non-nuclear weapon States.

We have reason to celebrate the signing of the START I and START II agreements and we are hopeful about their speedy ratification by all the parties concerned. After this has been accomplished, the agreements will reach a state of implementation which offers new challenges. Only when implementation is well under way can we truly rejoice about recent achievements.

For decades, non-proliferation has been on the international agenda, particularly as regards weapons of mass destruction. These weapons have a special potential for escalating local conflicts, which may get out of control and result in unpredictable threats to peace and security. The highest priority should now be given to the non-proliferation of such weapons.

The dissolution of the Soviet Union has raised concern regarding the increased risk of clandestine transfers of conventional weapons. And we cannot rule out the risk of such trade in weapons of mass destruction. It is thus of the utmost importance that we minimize the risk of an increase in black market sales of military arsenals at relatively low prices, particularly to areas of high political tension. Strong and determined action must be taken in order to protect borders - not least new borders - and ensure full control and openness in this respect.

Wherever possible, we should seek to establish mechanisms which serve as "early warning systems", ensuring openness and transparency, and indicating where and when national - or international - action is warranted. Sweden is currently involved in cooperation with several members of the Commonwealth of Independent States, with the aim of strengthening administrative and legislative systems for effective border and customs control, providing financial support and training personnel. Moreover, Sweden is preparing to cooperate with the Russian Federation in the destruction of chemical weapons by providing expertise for such purposes. I note with satisfaction that the United States and other countries are prepared to give substantial

(Baroness af Ugglas, Sweden)

assistance, and I hope that concerted action by the international community will help to carry out, in practice, the destruction of chemical weapons as provided in the Convention recently signed in Paris.

It is imperative that we control transfers of weapons of mass destruction. But this is not enough. We must also control trade in essential components, equipment and weapon materials, such as uranium and plutonium. It is of equal and perhaps of even greater importance to prevent the proliferation of know-how for the production of weapons of mass destruction. We should also seek opportunities to utilize this vast expertise for peaceful purposes.

The initiatives to establish science and technology centres in Moscow and Kiev are excellent examples of a constructive approach to this problem. Sweden is participating in the funding of these two centres and will take an active part in their work. It is my sincere hope that many countries will support the centres and help to give weapons experts the opportunity to contribute to peace and economic growth.

The non-proliferation Treaty is the basis for the nuclear non-proliferation regime. Today, there are 155 States parties to the Treaty. Adherence to the Treaty is firmly established as a norm for international behaviour. I urge all nations to become parties to the Treaty, and to act forcefully to implement existing safeguards systems. It is imperative that all States with nuclear weapons on their territory or States with significant nuclear programmes adhere to the NPT. Their willingness to do so and the commitment of the parties to the Treaty will be decisive in the work to successfully prepare for the NPT review conference in 1995 and to provide for the indefinite extension of the Treaty.

Four of the five nuclear-weapon States are currently observing a temporary cessation of nuclear testing. Sweden urges all nuclear-weapon States to declare moratoria and to extend existing moratoria when they expire. It is to be hoped that this process could lead to an agreement in the near future on a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty.

The signing of the chemical weapons Convention in Paris last month was a historic event. I congratulate the Conference on Disarmament for having been instrumental in the process of reaching this agreement on a Convention which already has more than 130 signatories. The Convention on chemical weapons is an inspiration for the international community to achieve the same goal with regard to nuclear weapons.

Openness and transparency are fundamental confidence-building measures. One instrument in this respect is the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms, established by the General Assembly in 1991. Sweden is now in the process of providing the information requested in the Register, and we hope that other countries will follow suit. Sweden will take an active part in the discussions in this and other forums to expand the scope of the United Nations Register by the addition of further categories of equipment and data as

(Baroness af Ugglas, Sweden)

regards military holdings and procurement. The General Assembly has requested that the Conference on Disarmament address the issue of destabilizing accumulations of arms, and elaborate practical means to increase transparency and openness in this field. These endeavours are one aspect of efforts at the United Nations to improve the reporting system for objective information on military matters. This task is relatively new for the CD, and the in-depth discussions which are required have been delayed considerably. I hope that these difficulties can be overcome and that a comprehensive report with proposals can be submitted to the next General Assembly.

The new opportunities for multilateral disarmament, arms control and security which are arising in a multipolar world will have to be explored further. The growing importance of the United Nations, in particular the Security Council, shows that the international community can act jointly and with great responsibility. The meeting of the Security Council a year ago with the heads of State and government is clear evidence of the Council's political determination. This also applies to the United Nations Secretary-General's report on "New dimensions of arms regulation and disarmament in the post-cold-war era", which clearly states that arms control and disarmament are integral aspects of peace-keeping, peace-making and peace-building.

The various United Nations bodies must work effectively to support each other and promote progress in one of the most fundamental tasks of the United Nations: to enhance peace and security. The Security Council has ultimate responsibility for defining threats to international security and for trying to eliminate them. The General Assembly is a forum for normative discussions and resolutions. The United Nations Disarmament Commission is another instrument which should be used for a more focused debate, paving the way for substantive and conclusive discussions in the CD, and also for formal negotiations.

The Conference on Disarmament is now in the fourth decade of its existence. It is a child of the cold war, reflecting in its agenda and the composition of its membership the bipolar structure of a world that now is history. The CD was created to respond to the need for a multilateral negotiating body in a security environment created by two opposing military alliances. Its agenda was a reflection of the security concerns which prevailed at the time. Even the composition of the CD was determined by the realities of a bipolar world and this also applied to working methods, decision-making and group structures. The political changes of recent years and the dissolution of the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact provide new opportunities for multilateral negotiations on disarmament. We must not only adjust to new realities but also use our prerogative to shape our common future by achieving increased cooperation in the disarmament field.

During the last few years, the Conference's work has largely focused on negotiations on the Convention on chemical weapons. Having accomplished this task, the CD must now devote its attention to other issues of substance. For the near future, I suggest that the CD concentrate its efforts on four main areas.

(Baroness af Ugglas, Sweden)

First, non-proliferation of nuclear weapons must be given the highest priority. A test ban is an essential step towards the goal of nuclear disarmament. It is my understanding that the existing moratoria might develop into substantial negotiations on this issue. Efforts in the field of non-proliferation should also include transparency and control regarding transfers of nuclear technology and sensitive expertise, a ban on attacks on nuclear facilities and possibly other issues.

Secondly, intensified efforts are required to address the problems of excessive and destabilizing accumulations of conventional arms. Such efforts should include, inter alia, the exchange of information, and also control and restrictions on transfers of conventional arms.

Thirdly, in the new security environment, confidence-building measures are crucial for the maintenance of peace and stability. Such measures can be developed in many different areas - conventional and nuclear arms and outer space, for example.

Fourthly, it might also prove useful to initiate deliberations on regional security arrangements. Current and potential conflicts demonstrate that most security problems today are of a regional or local nature. As the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe I consider that one of my tasks is to try to develop the CSCE efforts in this area, concentrating on the new security forum in Vienna. The CD could serve as a forum for the exchange of information and experience in this field and it could try to find ways to promote regional security arrangements.

The composition of the CD does not correspond to the present political map. Today, there are more countries with observer status than there are members of this Conference. Evidently there is a great and growing interest amongst the nations of the world in taking part in multilateral negotiations on disarmament. The CD should respond to these developments. I wish to recall that Sweden has already suggested that the CD should be open to all States which have applied for membership.

The efficiency of the CD could be greatly improved by a modification of the consensus rule, at least as regards procedural matters. It is not reasonable that one country may use the consensus rule to prevent the Conference from considering an issue which an overwhelming majority of States wishes to address.

I note with satisfaction that, during this session, the CD has already decided to establish ad hoc committees in four important areas: a nuclear test ban, negative security assurances, the prevention of an arms race in outer space and transparency in armaments. This I find very encouraging and it clearly demonstrates the determination of the Conference on Disarmament to go to work on important issues of substance without losing time in procedural debates.

(Baroness af Ugglas, Sweden)

Today, disarmament agreements have been concluded which it would have been impossible to imagine only a few years ago. Let the CD use the momentum thus created to achieve definitive progress and results on these major issues of disarmament and non-proliferation which I have just enumerated in the not too distant future. What seem to be distant possibilities today may be the realities of tomorrow.

The PRESIDENT: I thank Her Excellency the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Sweden on behalf of the Conference for her important statement and for the kind words she addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the representative of Poland, Ambassador Dembinski.

Mr. DEMBINSKI (Poland): Mr. President, first of all, let me associate myself with the congratulations which previous speakers have addressed to you on your taking up the presidency of the Conference on Disarmament. The skill and courtesy with which you have led this body to agree on and adopt its 1993 agenda make us confident that the important business of the CD is in good and competent hands. You will have my delegation's total support and co-operation in your endeavours. With your permission, I would also like to express to your distinguished predecessor, Ambassador Michel Servais of Belgium, our admiration and appreciation for his leadership and indefatigable efforts during his extended term of office. I would also like to associate myself with the words of welcome addressed to the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Sweden, Baroness Margaretha af Ugglas, and I am particularly honoured to be able to take the floor immediately following her. I should also like to take this opportunity to welcome the distinguished representatives who have recently taken their posts at the Conference on Disarmament: Ambassador Juan Archibaldo Lanús of Argentina, Ambassador Wolfgang Hoffmann of Germany, Ambassador György Boytha of Hungary, Ambassador Satish Chandra of India, Ambassador Don Nanjira of Kenya and Ambassador Lars Norberg of Sweden. I look forward to close and constructive co-operation with them all and with their delegations. The words of greetings and appreciation are also addressed to the Secretary-General of the Conference on Disarmament and his able staff, on whose dedication and expertise so much depends in this conference room.

In my intervention today it is my intention to comment only on some issues on whose consideration this body is expected to report to the Chairman of the First Committee at its reconvened session early next March. This approach, of course, is without prejudice to issues not addressed at this time. Poland has welcomed with satisfaction the far-sighted and timely report of the Secretary-General of the United Nations entitled "New dimensions of arms regulation and disarmament in the post-cold-war era". In our view it is an important and inspiring document. It succinctly explores the complex problems of broadly conceived international security in a world on the threshold of the twenty-first century. My delegation subscribes to many comments on the report which the previous speakers have already put on record.

The international security environment is at a crucial moment, with both opportunities and challenges ahead. The opportunities opened by the collapse of the communist system as well as the transition from confrontation to cooperation are now confirmed and enlarged by the unprecedented advances in

(Mr. Dembinski, Poland)

the area of arms control and disarmament, nuclear and conventional. The latest and most welcome manifestations are, of course, the bilateral strategic arms reduction Treaty (START II), signed in Moscow on 3 January, and the Convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons signed in Paris barely 10 days later by as many as 132 States.

These accords are truly landmark accomplishments. The first, by reducing the current levels of strategic offensive nuclear arms of Russia and the United States by two thirds and by providing for the elimination of all land-based multi-warhead intercontinental ballistic missiles, enhances stability and confidence between the two signatory Powers. The latter has established unmistakable and unequivocal international norms against a whole category of weapons of mass destruction.

This bright picture of mankind's sanity is brought into fuller relief by the growing universalization of the NPT, now adhered to by over 150 States, including all the permanent members of the United Nations Security Council. Political consistency and the logic of survival call for the Treaty, any defects notwithstanding, to be upheld and indefinitely extended, without any conditions or linkage whatsoever. In my country's firm view, they also call for the members of the Commonwealth of Independent States to accede to the NPT as non-nuclear States as soon as possible.

In the conventional field, the 1990 CFE Treaty has eloquently demonstrated that conventional disarmament is not off limits in Europe or, indeed, anywhere else.

So much on the side of opportunities. Challenges are less clear-cut or predictable. Paradoxically, in the common perception of international security the fast-receding threat of global nuclear conflagration is being replaced by growing instability and threats deriving from rampant nationalisms reviving in Europe and beyond. The fierce regional conflicts erupting over ethnic, religious, political, economic and a host of other issues is a time bomb that rivals any explosive device.

If the international community is to be prepared and able to face this new category of threats to world peace and security, new mechanisms and procedures to deal with them effectively must be developed and put in place urgently. In this connection, we have noted with interest the Secretary-General's reference in his report to "the larger network of international cooperative behaviour which is designed to safeguard the security of all nations". We also consider that the concepts of integration, globalization and revitalization applied to disarmament merit closer examination as promising approaches to developing a new, international cooperative security system.

As the Secretary-General's report makes amply clear, in that regard the role of regional and subregional organizations, in close cooperation with the United Nations system and its mechanisms, can hardly be overestimated. The CSCE process in Europe and its results over the years as regards

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confidence-building represent a striking example of a regional approach whose broader relevance cannot escape anyone. In our view, any consideration of new mechanisms in the area of international peace and security would be found wanting without stress laid on the mutual interdependence of the existing framework: the General Assembly and the Security Council, the First Committee and the United Nations Disarmament Commission, the Conference on Disarmament and other international bodies, whether global or regional in scope. We are in full accord with the Secretary-General that the United Nations system and international organizations in general should play a more significant role also in respect of the globalization of disarmament.

To turn to more substantive business at hand, my delegation finds it heartening that the Conference on Disarmament - by adopting its agenda and programme of work for 1993 - has displayed a commendable meeting of minds with the Secretary-General who urged in his report that "efforts [should] be focused by the CD on well-defined and urgent issues". The Conference on Disarmament has complied. Given the existing and emerging new threats, the Conference's focus is unmistakably on weapons of mass destruction. The nuclear-test-ban issue, where substantive progress, let alone solution, has eluded this body for years, now appears to stand a fair chance of productive consideration. Indeed, we believe that by building on past achievements referred to above, especially the START II accord, it should be possible to proceed with a constructive pace of work in the Ad Hoc Committee concerned. The current nuclear test moratoria put into effect by several nuclear Powers create a climate conducive to meaningful progress towards a comprehensive and early ban on nuclear testing. Efforts in this regard - and in nuclear disarmament in general - would obviously stand a better chance if the negotiating process could be enlarged to include all nuclear-weapon States.

In this connection, it is hardly possible to disagree with the Secretary-General that at a time when disarmament on a substantial scale is becoming a reality, there can be no justification for any State, anywhere, to reach for and acquire the tools and technologies of mass destruction. Yet, as we know, this warning is unfortunately not necessarily heeded. Given this fact the question of weapons of mass destruction - nuclear, chemical and biological - continues to be of paramount concern to the global community. If and when the recently signed CW Convention gains universal adherence and enters into force, mankind will be able to congratulate itself on an auspicious beginning. The Republic of Poland, for its part, is determined to spare no effort in order to bring that moment closer. To this end, Poland will proceed without undue delay to open the requisite process of ratification of the Convention. We are also prepared to make a fair and meaningful contribution to efforts aiming at the elaboration of equally comprehensive instruments to prevent the spread of weapons and technologies of mass destruction as well as relevant delivery technologies.

My delegation strongly believes that efforts to check the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and ban them altogether should go hand in hand with the endeavours commenced only last year in respect of transparency in armaments and conventional disarmament. While transparency and openness in military matters per se are no substitute for concrete arms cuts, they are in

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the view of the Secretary-General "crucially important as part of the process of building confidence". Measures in that regard, by alerting the international community to excessive concentrations of armaments going beyond legitimate defence needs, would facilitate timely preventive action.

The Conference on Disarmament needs to approach this agenda item with dedication and a sense of purpose. As the distinguished representative of the Netherlands observed earlier in his intervention, we are only at an initial stage of examination of the issues involved. In considering the interrelated questions of transparency in armaments, conventional disarmament and confidence-building, the Conference on Disarmament should bring to bear its negotiating expertise and live up to its standing as the single, multilateral disarmament negotiating body, a standing so remarkably reaffirmed by the successful conclusion of the CW Convention.

In point of fact, in our consideration of the ways of improving the effectiveness of this body, its negotiating character as well as the principle of consensus must be reasserted again and again. As an effective organ with a broad and clear mandate to negotiate concrete arms control and disarmament instruments whose time has come, it should not allow its attention to be diverted or specific expertise dissipated. The accumulated experience of the CD, so remarkably enriched in the CW Convention negotiating process, proves that the singleness of purpose and concentrated, painstaking international efforts, coupled with the political will of States, can yield concrete and meaningful results. The negotiating ability and potential which this organ can legitimately be proud of should therefore be cherished and preserved to be available to the international community when the time is right to elaborate specific instruments. It is therefore essential that the CD should concentrate its efforts on specific, attainable goals. It should avoid spending too much of its precious time discussing broad issues of international security which in the foreseeable future cannot be translated into the language of legally binding international instruments.

As many speakers have indicated (thus confirming some of the conclusions which Ambassador Servais arrived at following his inter-sessional consultations), the time of change has come for the CD, at least as far as its composition is concerned. The Polish delegation is open and flexible in that regard, although we certainly do not favour an extreme approach. We feel that a judicious middle ground must be found between the negotiating effectiveness of the CD, on the one hand, and the legitimate aspirations of States to have a say on matters which affect their security interests and concerns, on the other hand. It is for this reason, therefore, that Poland would support accommodating those States which by their consistent, long-standing and constructive participation as observers have demonstrated that they can and are prepared to contribute to our common endeavours in the interests of peace and security for all.

The PRESIDENT: I thank Ambassador Dembinski for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the representative of Indonesia, Ambassador Brotodiningrat.

Mr. BRODODININGRAT (Indonesia): Mr. President, on behalf of the Indonesian delegation, let me first congratulate you upon your assumption of the presidency of the Conference on Disarmament. We have unreserved confidence in your able leadership to bring us to a smooth take-off toward a hopefully productive and fruitful 1993 session. We pledge to you our full support and active cooperation in the discharge of your demanding task. May I also pay tribute to your predecessor, Ambassador Michel Servais of Belgium, and thank him for his most valuable contribution to our work? Allow me as well to take this opportunity to join others in welcoming our new colleagues, Ambassador Lanús of Argentina, Ambassador Hoffmann of Germany, Ambassador Boytha of Hungary, Ambassador Chandra of India, Ambassador Don Nanjira of Kenya and Ambassador Norberg of Sweden. I trust that they will bring with them new ideas which will help refresh the Conference on Disarmament.

Last August, towards the end of our 1992 session, my delegation made a rather comprehensive statement before this plenary forum, covering a number of issues of particular relevance to us. Therefore, in the interest of saving time, I shall do my best in trying to avoid a rerun, and instead confine myself to some issues which need to be addressed urgently. Nevertheless it would be less than appropriate not to seize this occasion to express the satisfaction of my Government at the encouraging developments registered most recently. Here, I would like to refer in particular to the landmark signing of the chemical weapons Convention and the welcome conclusion of the START II agreement between the United States of America and the Russian Federation.

As a country which has for so long been firmly committed to the prohibition of such abhorrent weapons of mass destruction as chemical weapons, Indonesia was proud to join more than 100 other countries in Paris to become the original signatories of the chemical weapons Convention. It is our sincere hope that, once it enters into force, the chemical weapons Convention will not only help alleviate human suffering in the event of war, but also facilitate development cooperation among nations in time of peace. We are looking forward to a fruitful session of the Preparatory Commission in The Hague next week.

With regard to the conclusion of the START II agreement, we congratulate and appreciate the two protagonists, the United States of America and the Russian Federation, for their very important achievement. It is obvious that the substantial reduction of strategic offensive weapons from the nuclear arsenal of the two countries is bound to have a positive impact on world peace and international security. My delegation only hopes that all the parties concerned in the agreement will spare no effort in making the entry into effect of this important agreement, together with its precursor - START I, concluded in July 1991 - a reality.

Let me now turn to the report of the United Nations Secretary-General entitled "New dimensions of arms regulation and disarmament in the post-cold-war era", by expressing at the outset our most sincere appreciation for this timely and pertinent initiative. We see merit in the suggestion of the Secretary-General that, because of the profoundly changing international

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environment, many of the tasks and methods pertaining to disarmament used by the international community in the past should be reviewed and reformed. In this context, we note with keen interest his general idea on the "new dimensions" laid down around the three concepts of integration, globalization and revitalization. The following are our brief comments on each of these concepts.

With regard to the concept of integration, my delegation finds itself in general agreement with the basic premise that the process of global disarmament should be closely coordinated with efforts in other fields and should be part of the larger network of international cooperative behaviour such as peace-making, peace-keeping and peace-building. However, we have to admit that, conceptually, it is still unclear to us how specific arms limitation or disarmament measures integrated into particular peace-making, peace-keeping and peace-building operations in given countries could be generated and globalized toward the objective of general and complete disarmament, so as to safeguard the security of all nations, as intended by the concept itself. On the question of the use of disarmament measures in the enforcement of peace, we share the fervent hope of the Secretary-General that the global community will not have to witness again the same circumstances upon which the idea was developed. This means that we would prefer a suggestion to prevent such circumstances from recurring.

Another aspect in the concept of integration, as suggested by the Secretary-General, with which we find ourselves in agreement is the correlation between disarmament measures and economic conditions. However, on this matter, while we do not challenge the validity of the conclusion drawn in the report on the short-term costs of disarmament, we would have wished to be presented with an analysis of the longer-term gains of disarmament as well. In the broader context, we believe it would be useful to revisit the old concept of the linkage between disarmament and development, this time against a new and more complex backdrop in which security can no longer be defined solely in military terms but should also embrace economic and social factors.

On the concept of globalization, my delegation is gratified to note the reiteration in the report of the goal to extend disarmament efforts to include not only bilateral agreements but also multilateral arrangements in a worldwide process involving all States. However, unlike the Secretary-General, we still believe that the major military Powers should disarm more, if not first, for the simple reason that they have indeed more to disarm.

As to the regional approach to security, we are of the view that security problems which are region-specific are best addressed within an appropriate regional context. Such efforts could be realized inter alia through confidence-building measures, balanced security at the lowest possible level of armaments and armed forces, and the elimination of destabilizing military capabilities and imbalances. We learned from experience that regional dialogues on security and cooperation could be very helpful in this regard. In sum, we do believe that global and regional approaches to disarmament complement each other and should be pursued simultaneously.

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Turning to the concept of revitalization, we only hope that the substantial achievements, in nuclear disarmament listed in the report will serve as an encouragement to build upon rather than a brake on further endeavours. In this post-cold-war era, the goal set by the international community for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons remains valid. In this context, we agree with the Secretary-General that a comprehensive ban on nuclear testing would be a significant step leading to that goal. With regard to the question of proliferation control we are looking forward to the non-proliferation Treaty review conference in 1995, which should provide an opportunity to redress the existing inequities and asymmetries. In this regard, the readiness of the nuclear-weapon States parties to the non-proliferation Treaty to fulfil their solemn obligations will help ensure the success of the Treaty's extension.

My delegation shares the view that international security and stability would be greatly enhanced by increased openness and transparency in the military field, particularly in the area of arms transfers. In this connection the register of such transfers should be comprehensive, universal and non-discriminatory and implemented in such a way as to facilitate input from all States. We also believe that meaningful progress in the whole exercise remains doubtful unless the pervasive role of the arms industry and the military establishment as well as the producers and suppliers of arms is taken into full account.

By the same token, our attention should be focused on enhancing the United Nations role to become the repository of objective data, primarily through the collection, compilation and dissemination of information on military matters. In line with the emerging trend toward greater openness in the military field, the establishment of a satellite communications system under the auspices of the United Nations would be particularly useful to compile data on armed forces and armaments production, military research and development, arms transfers, etc., all of which would make a significant contribution to confidence-building, remove apprehension and ultimately facilitate the process of disarmament in general.

Finally, with respect to the question of new machinery, to be honest we have been unable to find any really new proposal in the report. It seems that the Secretary-General considers it still appropriate to maintain the current basic institutional triad composed of the First Committee of the General Assembly, the United Nations Disarmament Commission and the Conference on Disarmament. At the same time, my delegation cannot agree more with him on the need to strengthen coordination amongst those three bodies. In the light of the broadening notion of security and disarmament, we would even venture to suggest the opening of inter-institutional channels of relationship with other bodies and organizations considered relevant to the context of the new dimensions. In this connection, however, while we see the logic in the Secretary-General's proposal for greater involvement by the Security Council in disarmament, in particular where the enforcement of non-proliferation is concerned, we feel it is absolutely essential to ensure that this body strictly conforms to its mandate as defined in the Charter, and avoids any

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possible encroachment into the jurisdiction and prerogatives of the General Assembly concerning the formulation of principles governing disarmament and arms regulation.

On the other hand, we support the Secretary-General's view on the need for the First Committee of the General Assembly, the United Nations Disarmament Commission and the Conference on Disarmament to review in a comprehensive manner their structures as well as their work methods and practices, so as to be able to address disarmament problems promptly, flexibly and efficiently. We are encouraged to note that efforts along these lines are currently under way within these three bodies. This brings me to our own efforts in enhancing the effective functioning of the Conference on Disarmament.

On this particular subject, without in any way prejudging the work currently undertaken under the leadership of the two most distinguished Friends of the President, we would like at this point to say the following few words. Firstly, on the question of the agenda, while standing ready to discuss its possible rationalization, my delegation remains convinced of the primacy of the nuclear items on the agenda. We would like to take this opportunity to stress the great importance that the heads of State and Government of the non-aligned countries continue to attach to the nuclear disarmament mandate of the Conference on Disarmament. Secondly, as regards the issue of membership, at this juncture we only wish to recall the general principle re-emphasized in the last non-aligned summit in Jakarta on the right and duty of all States to participate in multilateral efforts on disarmament on the basis of equality and mutual benefit in order to promote universal adherence. Thirdly and lastly, with respect to the Secretary-General's proposal to give a function to the Conference on Disarmament as a "permanent review and supervisory body for some existing multilateral arms regulation and disarmament agreements", unless the membership of the Conference on Disarmament is made open-ended, we foresee practical problems of participation, since not all members of the Conference on Disarmament are parties to all existing agreements and vice versa.

Now to conclude, in facing the changing international environment, it is indeed our common concern and collective duty to review, readjust and, if necessary, restructure the existing international disarmament and arms control mechanism. But we should always keep in mind not to put the cart before the horse by doing this to the detriment of our work on substantive issues. After all, in the final analysis, important as it may be, a strengthened mechanism remains just a means to achieve the real goal, which is the substantive objective to which we all aspire.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Indonesia for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair.

(continued in Spanish)

I now have pleasure in giving the floor to the representative of Argentina, Ambassador Lanús.

Mr. LANUS (Argentina) (translated from Spanish): As I make my first substantive statement as the head of the delegation of my country to the Conference on Disarmament, I do so under the presidency of Brazil in the person of a distinguished representative of the best diplomatic tradition of Itamaraty, you, Ambassador Celso Amorim. To my personal satisfaction and that of my delegation is added the satisfaction of being able to put on record once again before the plenary of this Conference the great importance Argentina attaches to the harmonization of its nuclear policy with Brazil. In a surprisingly short period of time, and thanks to the active support of other Latin American countries, this has allowed us to firmly commit our region to the non-proliferation endeavour. Today Latin America, thanks to accession to the chemical weapons Convention on a large scale and the forthcoming full entry into force of the Treaty of Tlatelolco, is on the verge of becoming the first densely populated region of the world to be absolutely and verifiably free from any kind of weapon of mass destruction. You yourself, Mr. Ambassador, have been one of the architects of this state of affairs, and so I am happy to be able to share these thoughts before the plenary of the Conference under your presidency.

I could not at this juncture fail to mention Ambassador Michel Servais, of Belgium, who not only skilfully brought the Conference to a close in 1992 but also, during the inter-sessional period, fully discharged the task we entrusted to him, along with you and the Secretary-General of the Conference, of beginning consultations aimed at solving such key questions for the functioning of our body as its expansion and the transformation of its agenda. We also most warmly welcome the new ambassadors and heads of delegation who recently joined the Conference. We wish their predecessors success in their new responsibilities.

The purpose of my statement this morning is to express my country's views on the recent report of the Secretary-General entitled "New dimensions of arms regulation and disarmament in the post-cold-war era" (A/C.1/47/7). These will not only reflect the specific analysis of the Secretary-General's document but will also set forth some more general considerations relating to the work of the multilateral disarmament machinery in the closing stages of the twentieth century following the end of a crucial period of contemporary history. Firstly, I must say that the Secretary-General's report is a timely document. I believe it is useful for the Secretary-General to reflect on the types of body we need in the field of disarmament and security in order to deal with the challenges of this new era, and especially I think it is necessary for the Member States of the United Nations to bring our ideas closer together as the true guiding forces of the process. I shall attempt to set out our ideas in a systematic fashion.

Firstly, any analysis of the present machinery and institutions in the field of disarmament must have as a starting-point the recognition of the need to preserve the primary responsibility of the United Nations in the field of disarmament. In this context, the presence of a negotiating forum of limited composition (though adapted in its membership to the present dimensions of the international community) is and continues to be necessary. Regional arrangements, which are of undoubted and growing importance, constitute a

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necessary complement to a multilateral organ in which all the regions of the globe are represented. Though today we congratulate ourselves on the successful conclusion of the chemical weapons Convention, we must also realize that without a multilateral organ like the Conference its scope, the number of signatories and its usefulness as an instrument for the establishment of a new order characterized by peace and stability would have been simply impossible.

Secondly, we agree with the Secretary-General when he states that the Conference should address well-defined issues. This is something that brooks no procrastination, especially when we see that items of indisputable importance still await more specific and systematic consideration by the Conference. In our opinion, the Conference has an irreplaceable role to play in such areas as the prohibition of nuclear tests, transparency in armaments, the prevention of an arms race in outer space and non-proliferation, an item on which we have taken but a few timid steps and which requires the inputs that can be made from here and the bodies that are traditionally responsible in this area.

Regrettably, conventional disarmament is still not a feature of our deliberations in the Conference. The concrete and well-defined issues are at hand. All we require now is to take the necessary decisions to address them, without prejudice to other questions mentioned by the Secretary-General in his report, such as conversion, which he correctly defines as a "post-disarmament issue". Perhaps this type of issue, important but not urgent, could profitably be taken up by the Disarmament Commission in order to embark on an analysis of what we could do at the multilateral level in this respect.

Thirdly, the existing machinery is in our view adequate. It is true, as pointed out by the Secretary-General, that it was designed at the time of the cold war. The reassessment he proposes is a useful exercise provided that we recognize that it is first and foremost the political decision-makers and their attitudes that must change rather than the institutions that will serve as a channel for them. The family of institutions with a role to play in disarmament affairs provides an adequate balance between bodies responsible for negotiation (the CD), deliberation (the First Committee of the General Assembly) and pre-negotiation or analysis (the Disarmament Commission). The Conference is a negotiating forum; its rule of procedure are simple and flexible and have very recently stood the most severe test of their efficiency and adaptability by providing us with a satisfactory framework to negotiate an agreement of the complexity and scope of the chemical weapons Convention. The United Nations Disarmament Commission has already begun a reorganization and consolidation exercise and the first results are beginning to appear, as exemplified by the guidelines on confidence-building measures, verification and other important contributions which the United Nations has produced recently. The First Committee is finally moving towards rationalization, as the last session of the General Assembly clearly proved. We believe, however, that this process should be strengthened; the number of resolutions must reflect concrete security concerns rather than concepts of lesser interest whose final purpose is sometimes not clear.

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Fourthly, we share the Secretary-General's view regarding the enhancement of the role of the Security Council in disarmament matters, most especially in the area of non-proliferation. The reference to this in the Convention on chemical weapons is an example of how we can gradually involve the Security Council in multilateral instruments so as to ensure effective compliance.

Fifthly, we must record our doubts about the idea expressed in the report of turning the Conference into a "permanent review and supervisory body for some existing multilateral arms regulation and disarmament agreements" - I quote the Secretary-General's words. Our understanding is that the CD is a negotiating body and not a review and/or supervisory body. Moreover, multilateral agreements and their review are matters for the States parties to these agreements and, as is well known, the Conference is an organ of limited membership, so that there are objective differences in the membership of treaties with over 100 parties, such as the NPT or the chemical weapons Conventions, and the Conference on Disarmament.

Sixthly, as far as our Conference is concerned, we are engaged in a thoroughgoing analysis of its functioning, including the questions of its agenda and composition. In the area of composition Argentina believes that its enlargement cannot be delayed any longer. We agree with those who believe that the present membership of the CD reflects a political/military balance specific to the cold war and that this structure has been superseded by events. This is becoming increasingly evident in terms of the dynamics of the functional groups in to which the Conference is divided. However, as far as the more immediate problem of the number of members is concerned, we must come to grips with the problem from a practical and expeditious standpoint. If we embark on an exercise to define "parameters of eligibility" we will probably never reach agreement. Hence it is advisable that concrete proposals should be drawn up, perhaps by the Special Coordinator, my distinguished neighbour the Ambassador of Australia, putting forward alternatives including a generous number of States and preserving the limited character which any negotiating body should have, while giving satisfaction to all those - and there are not so many - who for years have shown a real wish to participate and a specific ability to make useful contributions to the strengthening of peace and stability through multilateral disarmament agreements. If an international community of 160 members was adequately mirrored in a CD of 40 States, we consider that with almost 180 members in the General Assembly, the Conference could well expand its membership without this entailing an opening up to all comers which would ultimately redefine the very foundations of the Conference - a move that would perhaps require a decision taken by the full General Assembly.

Finally, I should like to refer to the question of the agenda, which is undoubtedly more difficult. For the time being we accept the inevitability of working with an agenda which in my view is a little diffuse and includes items that are obsolete or are too broad to lend themselves to negotiation. Here and elsewhere Argentina has expressed its conviction that it does not make sense to continue mechanically to include in the CD's agenda items which had a logical place in the world of East-West confrontation when the threat of

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nuclear war was real and the nuclear arms race a fact. Today all this has changed. No one with a modicum of intellectual honesty can deny it. To insist on items which are known in advance to be rhetorical and doomed to verbal jousting is to trivialize this body and, what is worse, to jeopardize its continuity, not to mention its leading role confirmed by the successful chemical weapons negotiations.

Argentina considers that the sole multilateral body for disarmament negotiations is too important to be turned into a battleground for polemics, a debating club or the venue for activities closer to academic seminars than to genuine disarmament negotiations. We are here for something more important. Let us demonstrate, as we did in the chemical weapons negotiations, that we are capable of making a contribution commensurate with this lofty responsibility.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I thank Ambassador Lanús of Argentina for his statement and for his warm and friendly remarks addressed to myself and my country. I give the floor to the distinguished representative of Cuba, Mrs. Bauta Solés.

Mrs. BAUTA SOLES (Cuba) (translated from Spanish): We share the pleasure expressed earlier by other speakers at seeing you preside over the work of this Conference with the intelligence and careful judgement characteristic of the delegation of Brazil in this body. We appreciate the assistance you gave to your predecessor Ambassador Servais of Belgium during the process of inter-sessional consultations on the important issues of the agenda and composition of the Conference on Disarmament and we also wish to state clearly for the record how grateful we are for the untiring and enthusiastic efforts made by your predecessor during the time he bore such a complex responsibility. We are honoured by the presence of the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Sweden this morning. We listened carefully to her statement. We cannot neglect this opportunity to convey gratitude to the Secretary-General, Mr. Vicente Berasategui, for his contributions to our daily work, or to say how highly we appreciate the distinguished work done by Mr. Abdelkader Bensmail and his team during the work that culminated in the conclusion of the Convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons. We offer greetings which Ambassador Pérez Novoa will duly echo to his colleagues who have recently joined this body. We assure both you and them of the readiness of the Cuban delegation to offer its full cooperation. To those who have left us, we express the most sincere wishes for personal happiness and professional success.

Sir, you have invited us to comment on the Secretary-General's report entitled "New dimensions of arms regulation and disarmament in the post-cold-war era" (A/C1/47/7), which refers to the need to review and reshape the tasks and the methods used up to the present in the sphere of disarmament, bearing in mind that with the end of the cold war and the East-West confrontation, there has been a radical change in international circumstances.

The pursuit of perfection has been a spur to mankind from ancestral times and goes a long way towards explaining many of the advantages enjoyed by

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present-day civilization. Haste and improvisation have caused many of its set-backs. The basic premise to tackle this undertaking derives from awareness of the need for a calm and collective review of the prevailing rules in order to identify those which can be improved and those which remain valid. The phenomena cited by the Secretary-General in his report and other current events affect each of the regions of the globe differently, without our being able to assess their full impact for the moment. Nevertheless, and perhaps precisely for that reason, the purposes and principles enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations, which have been helping to set priorities in disarmament matters, are still fully valid as far as our delegation is concerned, not merely as a guideline for action, but as guarantees that no set of interests will be given greater weight than any other. The report of the Secretary-General has triggered a process of reflection which, because of its scope, cannot but embrace the international community as a whole and culminate in multilaterally negotiated agreements. Preferably it should be the General Assembly which, in the light of the present situation, spells out the future ramifications of disarmament issues and decides on possible adjustments to the multilateral machinery.

The process of disarmament and arms limitation must enjoy the highest priority multilaterally. Even in the new circumstances there is justification for the existence and build-up of excessive quantities of nuclear and other weapons in the stockpiles of certain States. The importance of bilateral nuclear arms reduction agreements should not be undermined by the process whereby the accuracy and effectiveness of these weapons are enhanced, nor by the existence and development of weapons for rapid large-scale attacks deep into the territory of third countries. Our delegation is persuaded that one of the best contributions that the multilateral body can make to the cause of disarmament, peace and security in the world is to promote the adoption in each State of a purely defensive military doctrine and structure.

While disarmament is different in substance from arms control, both stand at a distance from the problems involved in activities for the maintenance of international peace and security. It is the letter and the spirit of the United Nations Charter which, with its full application, sets the scene for implementation in each of these areas of competence of the United Nations. It is essential for the benefit of all, and particularly for the credibility of the world organization, that in discharging its obligations in one sphere or another it should demonstrate the greatest possible respect for the sovereignty of all its members, refraining from the use or the threat of force, just as it should not allow attacks on territorial integrity or the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of States. It must be stated that disarmament measures adopted as a result of peace-keeping operations are generally unilateral or limited in nature, whether they are imposed or negotiated, but in those instances only the parties concerned in the conflict are involved. Disarmament measures adopted as a result of a multilateral negotiating process tend to reflect the sovereign desire of the participants in them to eliminate or limit a type or a set of weapons' systems. In no way can the negotiating process be imposed by any United Nations body.

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The disarmament and arms limitation process has its own momentum and must retain its independence in organization without neglecting the relationship between this process and others under way in international relations as a whole, as in the interrelationship between peace, disarmament and development. It is clear that there is a need for joint deliberation in order to achieve a common understanding about ideas put forward in the Secretary-General's document, including integration, globalization, revitalization and others. As the delegation of Mexico stated in the last plenary, we consider that the priorities set forth in the 1978 Final Document remain and that the conclusions set out in the Declaration adopted that year also remain valid. This does not exclude the possibility of identifying specific areas within those priorities on which to focus our efforts now, to help the Conference on Disarmament to achieve new results, particularly as the priorities laid down do not prevent the parallel analysis of any question seemed appropriate. Negotiations to achieve nuclear disarmament must be carried out at every level, bilateral, multilateral and the two avenues of work should mutually and appropriately complement one another. In this process, the complete prohibition of testing must remain the top priority, and as long as talks are continuing in this field, all the nuclear Powers must adopt indefinite moratoriums on testing.

Non-proliferation is a pressing issue in the matter of nuclear weapons. In its broadest and non-discriminatory interpretation the concept could also be extended to certain sorts of conventional weapons, particularly those that can facilitate large-scale offensive operations. We agree that there is a need to eliminate the controversial aspects associated with the current non-proliferation regime to make it acceptable for those countries that are not party to it. The universality of the regime depends largely on the guarantee it offers that nuclear weapons will be eliminated in the shortest possible time scale.

It is not only the Conference on Disarmament, whose adjustment to the new circumstances is the matter before us today, which is a child of the past. There are other bodies within the United Nations system that are even more out of step with the present circumstances. If we are wearing ourselves out with conjectures about the best way to reflect the state of the world as it is today in the membership of the Conference on Disarmament, what can we say about the membership of the Security Council, which the Secretary-General suggests should play a greater role in the sphere of disarmament? Democratization, involving the developing South, is a prerequisite for thinking about expanding the powers of that body, whose role in the maintenance of international peace and security is clearly set forth in the United Nations Charter, although we might say in passing that it does not include interference in the internal affairs of States.

The issue of transparency in international arms transfers is of particular importance, but if we analyse this problem without addressing the problem of the production and storage of weaponry, military research and development activities, among other issues, we will overlook the main arms producers, who are also those who possess military power which substantially

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exceeds their own defence needs. Consequently, it is not only essential to put into practice the Register of Conventional Arms, but also to guarantee that it will be duly extended in the immediate future as stipulated in the United Nations resolution on the subject.

It is true that once existing disarmament agreements are implemented and others are concluded, the job of conversion will be a new dimension to which efforts will have to be channelled. Meanwhile there are other challenges we will have to meet, most important among which to our mind is the need to take advantage of the favourable circumstances provided by the end of the cold war so as to finalize the work that the international community had assigned itself in the matter of disarmament. Examples are the conclusion of a treaty for the complete suspension of nuclear testing and the remaining negotiations on weapons of mass destruction. Thus it is doubly necessary to preserve the present institutional mechanisms on disarmament and their specific functions. The reasons for the lack of progress in this sphere do not lie with them but in reasons underpinning the negotiating stance of some nations. The Conference on Disarmament should continue functioning as the only multilateral negotiating body and it is for that very reason that the process of self-examination in which we are now absorbed is aimed at enhancing its effectiveness. We also consider that the United Nations not only can but must continue to occupy a prominent position in matters of disarmament. Hence, in order that there should be a proper correspondence between the objectives to be attained and the measures to achieve this, we feel like other delegations that the Department for Disarmament Affairs should be properly prepared to tackle the tasks that await it.

Mr. President, we do not wish to end without thanking you for designating the special coordinators on the agenda and composition of the Conference on Disarmament. In the next few days we shall take part in the discussions that will be held for those purposes. We are sure that under the leadership of the experienced Ambassadors Miguel Marín Bosch of Mexico and Paul O'Sullivan of Australia, we shall shortly be able to take the first steps towards solving these complex issues which we will address at a subsequent plenary meeting.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I thank the representative of Cuba for her statement and the kind words addressed to myself and my country.

(continued in English)

I now give the floor to the representative of the United States, Ambassador Ledogar.

Mr. LEDOGAR (United States of America): First of all I would like to join in the welcome expressed to new colleagues who have taken up their duties here amongst us since I last spoke in plenary. That was on 19 January and since that day a new President of the United States has been sworn in, the forty-second such peaceful transfer of power in the history of our Republic. During his campaign, President Clinton stressed his commitment to the interrelated goals of international peace and security. Arms control and disarmament are important components of that overall objective and, as the

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successful completion of the chemical weapons Convention has demonstrated, the Conference on Disarmament has played an important role. As the new United States Administration proceeds to focus its energies on security and arms control problems, my delegation will have more to say on specific issues, particularly as they relate to this body.

Mr. President, my delegation is pleased that the Conference has been able to get down to work so quickly, for which we commend you. We look forward to the substantive work ahead of us and welcome the establishment of a new Ad Hoc Committee on the important subject of transparency in armaments.

Today, I would like to make some general comments on the reports the CD has been asked to provide on the occasion of the resumed session of General Assembly First Committee, namely a status report on the CD, and a report containing CD views on the United Nations Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali's report entitled "New dimensions of arms regulations and disarmament in the post-cold-war era". First, we believe that, to be of any use, these reports should reflect this Conference's consensus. A compilation of differing, and perhaps opposing national views would provide nothing beyond views that will be provided anyway. First, concerning the CD status report, we believe it fully appropriate that the Conference on Disarmament, in the post-CWC and post-cold-war environment, is engaged in a self-examination. We welcome these reflections, as discussions continue, we intend to provide additional comments. As a multilateral disarmament negotiating body, the CD continues to be important, whether it is negotiating or seriously considering important issues. In our review of the CD we should look to how it can best be used to continue to serve the overall interests of the international community.

While the United States welcomes this wide-ranging review, we stand by the fundamental rules which guide us in conducting business. The CD works by consensus, thus providing a mechanism to protect vital national security interests, and which also serves to enhance the universal appeal of our products. Further, the CD is an autonomous body, with its own rules of procedure, working methods and decision-making authority. While we may welcome suggestions from elsewhere to focus our efforts, and may agree to follow up issues that have been commended to our attention, the decisions are ours to make.

The CD agenda should be reviewing in a realistic and pragmatic way. The agenda should reflect the move away from cold war rhetoric and old thinking. The world has witnessed much recent progress in arms control and disarmament, particularly in the nuclear arena. In our view, an enhanced focus on regional disarmament questions and such items as global confidence-building measures would be timely. The CD should tackle such topics as are "ready" for consideration, however, modest they may be.

The CD has long been seized with the question of membership expansion. The United States joined an earlier consensus for a limited expansion in the CD membership. The United States continues to support a limited expansion which would be reflective of new realities and requirements. In our view an

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open-ended membership would not reflect realities and would impact detrimentally on CD autonomy, the rule of consensus, and thus our ability to make significant progress. The United States understands the desire of many to join the CD and are sympathetic to their interests. For this reason, we have fully supported participation in many of the CD activities by non-member participant States.

The CD has been asked to report to the resumed session on its review. It is obviously our choice what and how to report. The extent to which the CD has reached consensus decisions on important questions could be included. While our review and decision-making should not be dictated by the timing of the resumed session of the First Committee, we welcome the opportunity to provide such information. The session provides a useful impetus to the CD itself in tackling the difficult questions before us.

Turning to the Secretary-General's report on "New dimensions", I think we all agree with its timeliness as the world has recently undergone dramatic changes. International security has been enhanced by these changes, as well as by significant progress in disarmament and arms control. At the same time, we are witnessing increasing instability and insecurity in certain regions of the world. Inasmuch as disarmament is an element in pursuit and maintenance of security, it stands to reason that the disarmament agenda should be influenced by the changes in the international and regional security scenes. Indeed, the old cold war disarmament agenda no longer holds the same relevance to the emerging real-world security concerns. The world has changed; the new agenda has to change with it.

Secretary-General Mr. Boutros Boutros-Ghali has called for a "new agenda"; and this call has been endorsed by many, including the United States. He has recognized that the new global situation demands a new approach. The United States generally endorses his "New dimensions" report and welcomes it as a move toward a more realistic approach to security and arms control concerns. We hope that the resumed session will reflect a general endorsement of this by all United Nations Member States.

Specifically, we agree with the observations in that report that the time has come for an integration of disarmament and arms regulation issues into the broader structure of the international peace and security agenda. Disarmament has never been an objective in isolation, but rather an element in securing peace, stability and security. Secondly, we agree the time has come for a globalization of the process of arms control and disarmament, which requires appropriate engagement of all States, not in dictating steps to others but in undertaking practical disarmament measures themselves. Indeed, the so-called super-Powers have responded to the injunction to take the lead; and, for a variety of reasons, the world is a very different place. The time has come for others to take appropriate steps as well. Thirdly, we agree the time has come to recognize the achievements to date in arms control and disarmament: achievements to be built upon and revitalized, as required. In this context, the United States welcomes the Preparatory Committee meetings which begin next week and the overall implementation of the chemical weapons Convention. We stress the need to give increasing emphasis to the overall problem of

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non-proliferation in all its aspects and support the endeavours under way in appropriate forums in pursuit of this objective. We fully endorse the Secretary-General's call for universal adherence to the NPT, and for its unconditional and indefinite extension in 1995. We call on all States to provide data to the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms this April and endorse efforts to stem the destabilizing transfers of conventional weapons. We will support other appropriate efforts to encourage transparency and openness in military matters, including the development of confidence-building measures with specific regional applications. And finally we support appropriate regional efforts designed to redress tensions and insecurity in those areas, such as those under way in the Middle East peace process and in Europe.

The question of disarmament machinery is also addressed in the United Nations Secretary-General's "New dimensions" report. We support the notion of a "coordinated system" as identified in the report involving various elements dealing with arms control and disarmament issues. Coordination does not require establishment of some new overall umbrella disarmament organization; rather we should seek better rationalization of the work of these various elements. Disarmament machinery, including United Nations machinery, in our view, should be organized to meet realistic substantive objectives and needs. Such needs should be clearly identified prior to any premature tinkering with machinery. The challenge we now face is to seek a better understanding of the post-cold-war international security situation and its attendant arms control dimension. In examining specific elements of global disarmament machinery, we note the following.

Firstly, the United Nations Disarmament Commission has already taken welcome reform decisions and is now in the process of trying them out. More experience is needed for an effective evaluation of its continued usefulness, as our Argentine colleague has pointed out. Secondly, as noted the Conference on Disarmament is an autonomous body, and master of its own fate. It is currently engaged in a self-generated review. The larger picture of how its work can be more effectively integrated into the overall multilateral disarmament machinery will have to be considered by the CD in this process. Thirdly, the United Nations General Assembly First Committee itself has all successfully initiated reform efforts over the past four years. A detailed review of its own agenda and work methods in light of these reforms might be an area to focus on in the resumed session. We will have a few suggestions in this context. And finally, the resumed session might also look into the status of the United Nations Office of Disarmament Affairs (ODA). We think that efforts could usefully be undertaken towards enhanced support for the Office within existing resources. It should be equipped to implement effectively the important responsibilities with which it has been charged.

These are just a few preliminary thoughts of the United States as we all prepare for the resumed session of the United Nations General Assembly's First Committee. We intend to provide our national views to the United Nations Secretary-General, as requested, and wish to contribute constructively to a consensus report by the CD to the resumed session.

Mr. BARBUDA (Brazil): Mr. President, first of all allow me to join all the previous speakers and personally congratulate you on the assumption of the presidency of the Conference on Disarmament.

My comments at this plenary session are addressed to the report by the United Nations Secretary-General entitled "New dimensions of disarmament and arms regulation in the post-cold-war era". In the first place the delegation of Brazil values this document because it expresses the authoritative views of a privileged observer of today's international scene. We also keep in mind the serious responsibilities of the Secretary-General in dealing with matters of crucial interest to mankind.

The report has already awakened the attention of many, for it covers a wide range of issues of concern both to the international community and to each individual State. Therefore, it requires careful consideration, before decisions can be taken. This exercise is a timely and useful one. My delegation is prepared to join the others in a collective reflection on the relevant elements contained in the report, including the future of the disarmament machinery. We will then be ready to formulate proposals to be eventually taken up for decision at the appropriate forum. For this purpose, we would like to put forward some comments on specific aspects of the report.

One of the assumptions of the document is that new conditions are present in the world after the end of the cold war, which, in spite of new threats and challenges, make it possible to build an international system capable of guaranteeing peace and security, at a minimum level of armaments. The report states that in order to achieve this objective the current challenges must be overcome through concerted action and broad participation of all States. In this sense, it is suggested that the concepts of integration, globalization and revitalization should guide the efforts towards disarmament and those related to international security.

The concept of integration suggests that the disarmament measures should be associated with other measures in the economic and political fields, for the promotion of peace and international security. This line of thought is surely well taken. But we hesitate to accept that integration should also apply to the organizational framework of disarmament, in the sense suggested by the Secretary-General. This idea should be further developed and clarified before we accept to deal with disarmament matters in a different framework. As the delegation of Brazil stated in the First Committee of the General Assembly, "disarmament involves fundamental national security issues and complex technical aspects which have to be carefully negotiated Disarmament also requires a specialized machinery, both for the negotiating phase as well as for the implementation phase The process of disarmament and techniques used in the context of peace-making, peace-keeping and peace enforcement should never be confused."

The concept of globalization refers to the need for all States to be involved in the efforts towards disarmament through actions concerted multilaterally. Addressing this subject, the Secretary-General mentions the fact that the reductions in nuclear weapons that have taken place until now

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have been achieved either through bilateral agreements or by unilateral initiatives. While recognizing the importance of these bilateral and unilateral measures, we are not prepared to accept a role of mere spectators for the international community as far as nuclear disarmament is concerned. As is known, the Brazilian Government has always held the view that nuclear disarmament, a matter that concerns the whole of mankind, is too important to have its consideration left solely to the nuclear Powers. The multilateral treatment of issues related to nuclear disarmament remains a priority in the field of disarmament. The international community should, on the other hand, constantly remind the nuclear Powers of their special responsibility in this context.

Finally, the concept of revitalization addresses the need of making full use of and further improving the existing instruments in the field of disarmament. The Secretary-General proposes a new system of international security, capable of dealing with the "new dimensions of insecurity". To be effective this system should be able, as stated in the report, "to instil sufficient confidence in the States to assure them that they no longer need abundant weaponry". The concepts presented under this section of the report need further clarification, and I would like to stress that the implementation of the proposed system would possibly require the strengthening and complementation of existing agreements. This might well be a complex task.

One of the questions mentioned by the Secretary-General that raises more worries in today's world is the threat of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the related technologies. The Brazilian Government wholly shares the concerns of the vast majority of countries regarding this issue. On our side, we took important non-proliferation measures, widely known, and which I will not enumerate now. With respect to the international dimension of this problem, we do not think that the strengthening of the existing non-proliferation regimes would suffice. Some of the existing guidelines in this area still represent undue restrictions on the right of the developing countries to access to the so-called sensitive technologies for peaceful uses. Conscious of the complexity of this question, and willing to contribute in a constructive way to its consideration, the Brazilian Government presented at the UNDC the idea of establishing an international regime for the control of transfers of dual-use technologies. Such a regime assumes that technology in itself is neutral and that what varies are the ends to which it is applied. It would consist of multilaterally agreed, binding, verifiable and non-discriminatory instruments. It would not hamper transfers of dual-use high technology, but it would, through appropriate verification mechanisms, ensure they are employed exclusively to peaceful ends. It is our understanding that such a regime can provide the international community with increased security and effectively deter potential proliferators.

Recent events have shown insufficiencies in the NPT regime, which demonstrates that one treaty alone cannot guarantee non-proliferation. None the less this international instrument is considered in the report of the Secretary-General as an essential pillar of the non-proliferation system. It is pertinent here to recall that, in this instrument, the renunciation of nuclear weapons on the part of the non-nuclear-weapon States is not balanced

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by a commitment on the part of the nuclear-weapon States towards the elimination of such weapons. In other words, the NPT, while trying to avert horizontal proliferation, does not address, in an effective way, vertical proliferation.

Though we are not a party to the NPT, we hope that the 1995 review conference could provide the opportunity also for a reappraisal of the doctrinal foundations of the Treaty in order that it may reflect the realities of the post-cold-war era, in particular the circumstance that nuclear deterrence theories have lost their consistency. In this context, the conclusion of agreements banning nuclear tests and providing "negative security assurances" would be an appropriate corollary to the NPT, which would certainly turn the nuclear non-proliferation regime into a more balanced one. As to the role of the non-proliferation regime of the NPT, I would like to recall that the experience of my country shows that there are other effective means of ensuring non-proliferation.

Another threat to international peace and security mentioned by the Secretary-General in his report refers to the destabilizing accumulation of weapons in certain regions of the world. Here again we share the apprehensions of the Secretary-General. However, we should remark that out of the US\$ 1 trillion spent annually on armaments, 80 per cent corresponds to expenditure by the developed countries. On the other hand, the Secretary-General correctly observes that "production overcapacities and surplus equipment in industrialized States are now increasingly feeding arms markets in parts of the developing world". The Governments of the developed countries have a special responsibility in respect of the need to curb the arms trade and resist pressures from the military-industrial complex.

As regards the Register of Conventional Arms established by resolution 46/36 L, we fully support this initiative. We would like to see all relevant systems of armaments included in the Register, as recommended in that resolution. It must be reiterated that from our point of view also, transparency, though important, as it contributes to greater confidence among nations, is not an end in itself and cannot be conceived as a substitute for reduction in military expenditure.

Approaching the end of his report, the Secretary-General expresses his concerns about the resistance to conversion projects on the part of the arms industry. This resistance, as we all know, is likely to increase as the recession goes on in most parts of the world with unemployment having reached unacceptable levels. We also share this concern. Recent studies have indicated that conversion can be considered as an investment process. It implies sacrifices and more expenditure at the beginning but it pays in the longer run. Conversion initiatives should therefore be carried on in order that resources currently employed in the weapons industries be diverted to peaceful activities in the developed world and to economic and technological cooperation directed to less favoured countries. Reallocation of resources to civil ends is a claim many times voiced in the United Nations. Conditions seem ripe now to translate this wish into reality.

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With regard to the organizational framework of disarmament - a question to which the Secretary-General consecrates the final part of his report - the Brazilian Government maintains the view that the existing machinery (comprising basically the First Committee, the UNDC and the CD) should remain essentially as it is now. These bodies have distinct and complementary mandates, as well as different compositions and working methods. With reference to the Conference on Disarmament, while acknowledging that some improvement in its working methods might be necessary, my delegation thinks that its role as the sole negotiating forum of the United Nations should in no way be diminished. We look forward to the results of consultations on the agenda and composition of the Conference, to be carried out by the special coordinators appointed by the President. In our view, however, a major step was already taken at the beginning of the present session when practical problems were solved and the Conference was put in a position to start soon substantive work on four agenda items expeditiously. As to the membership, my delegation is ready to consider a substantial increase, in order to accommodate as many interested candidates as possible, bearing in mind the need to preserve the efficiency of the Conference on Disarmament as a negotiating body. Another important aspect of this issue, in the light of the international reality, is the need to cope with concerns regarding balance not only among regions but also within each region.

As to the proposal for attributing to the CD the functions of a supervisory body over existing treaties, implicit in it seems to be the idea that the Conference should become an open-ended body, to which we do not agree. If, however, the membership of the Conference on Disarmament is to be kept limited, that proposal would be difficult to implement, since the composition of the CD would not correspond to that of the instruments it would supervise. Furthermore, disarmament treaties normally have their own review mechanisms, a fact that would raise problems of compatibility with the mechanisms to be established by the CD.

The final part of the report also contains one of the main proposals advocated by the Secretary-General, namely that for greater involvement of the Security Council in disarmament matters, in particular with regard to the enforcement of non-proliferation measures. Concerning this point, our understanding is that measures which result from multilaterally negotiated agreements should not be confused with measures which result from decisions that put an end to a conflict. Furthermore, any action by the Security Council must be fully backed by the Charter of the Organization and abide by the principles of international law.

To conclude with a general comment, I would like to say that the report of the Secretary-General contains interesting perceptions and proposals which can prove advantageous to the United Nations system once they have been developed and refined by the Member States in their collective deliberations. On the other side, we do not believe that fundamental institutional changes are required in the field of disarmament in order to meet the present challenges. The progress in disarmament we expect in the near future can

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be achieved through the existing machinery, provided there is sufficient political will on the part of the principal actors of the international system.

The PRESIDENT: I thank my colleague from Brazil for his statement. I can assure him that I will try to accommodate some of his views when I present the report to the Conference.

Before I turn to another subject, let me ask if there is any other speaker who wishes to take the floor at this stage. I see none.

The secretariat has circulated today a note by the President, appearing in document CD/WP.440, concerning requests from non-members to participate in the work of the Conference. So far, no objection has been raised in connection with the communications attached to the note. This being the case, I suggest that we adopt the recommendation contained in the document directly in plenary, on the understanding that this does not set a precedent for future occasions when an informal meeting may be necessary. May I take it that the Conference takes action as recommended?

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT: Before I adjourn this plenary meeting, I wish to announce that at 3.30 p.m. this afternoon, members of the Conference will hold an informal open-ended consultation in conference room I, adjacent to the Council Chamber, to continue our exchange of views on the report of the Secretary-General of the United Nations entitled "New dimensions of arms regulation and disarmament in the post-cold-war era". This is the meeting that was originally scheduled to take place immediately after this plenary session, which, in view of the late hour, I do not think it would be practical to have at this time. I wish also to announce that the non-members participating in the work of the Conference are invited to attend the consultation.

The next plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament will be held on Thursday, 11 February 1993, at 10 a.m.

The meeting rose at 12.45 p.m.

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/PV.642
11 February 1993

ENGLISH

FINAL RECORD OF THE SIX HUNDRED AND FORTY-SECOND PLENARY MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Thursday, 11 February 1993, at 10 a.m.

President: Mr. Celso Luiz Nunes Amorim (Brazil)

GE.93-60241 (E)

The PRESIDENT: I declare open the 642nd plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament.

I have on my list of speakers for today the representatives of Kenya, Germany, Egypt, Mongolia, Ukraine, Belarus, Venezuela, Sweden and the Russian Federation. I now give the floor to the representative of Kenya, Ambassador Don Nanjira.

Mr. DON NANJIRA (Kenya): Mr. President, at the outset I would like to congratulate you most warmly on your assumption of the presidency of the Conference on Disarmament during its first working month of its 1993 session. You have greatly impressed my delegation with your diplomatic skills and knowledge of disarmament issues as well as the functioning of this Conference and I wish you continued success during your remaining term of office. I should also like to register my gratitude to you and those delegations that formally accorded me a very warm welcome when I assumed my functions in this Conference. I pledge to you, Mr. President, and to all other delegations, including the newly arrived colleagues, my determination to cooperate and work with all of you in our common endeavours.

I would be remiss if I did not congratulate my very, very old good friend - old not in age, but old in time - the Secretary-General of the Conference and Personal Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, His Excellency Ambassador Vicente Berasategui, whom I have known for many years dating back to the days and years when I used to attend the work of the then Committee on Disarmament. I wish him continued success in his important work. I extend my good wishes also to the other members of the secretariat of the Conference.

With the conclusion of the draft chemical weapons convention in 1992, this Conference has attained its zenith as the single multilateral disarmament negotiating body. The Convention was opened for signature in Paris in January 1993, as we all know, and well over 100 countries attended the signing ceremony and actually signed the Convention, thereby reinforcing the fact that many countries have confidence in the functioning and results of this Conference, notwithstanding its limited membership of course. The chemical weapons Convention, once it achieves universal respect and membership, will finally close the sad chapter of the manufacture and use of chemical weapons in conflicts. This is indeed a major step in concerted international efforts to eliminate weapons of mass destruction and my Government, by signing the Convention, demonstrated its permanent policy of the total rejection of all weapons of mass destruction.

The international community cannot rest its case on the successful signing ceremony, however. There is still a lot of distance to be covered with regard to the total prohibition of another category of more hideous and abhorrent weapons of mass destruction, i.e. nuclear weapons. The changes on the international political scene have undoubtedly led to many achievements in the bilateral and multilateral interactions of States, and we cannot fail to hail the spirit of cooperation and confidence that prevails in our world

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today. The recent signing of the START II agreement between the United States of America and the Russian Federation was an important measure in the reduction of the cold war tensions, and in their place a new era seems to have started of resolving the consequences of the cold war period. We commend the two countries for having taken the courageous decision to further reduce their nuclear arsenals and we hope that the prevailing spirit will open a long and lasting avenue for nuclear disarmament involving not only those who possess these weapons but indeed also the international community as a whole.

The nuclear non-proliferation Treaty has successfully checked the horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons. In spite of its major imbalances, which have always been voiced, the Treaty continues to attract new States parties, including African States, and this clearly underlines the unpopularity of nuclear weapons. As far as the Kenya Government knows, there continues to be only five nuclear-weapon States. However, we cannot ignore the serious problems of ownership of nuclear weapons following the demise of the former Soviet Union. No effort should therefore be spared to preserve the existing status quo as the proliferation of such weapons could lead to regrettable consequences especially in areas where political tensions still remain very high.

In addressing the horizontal nuclear non-proliferation issue, one can never do justice to this important question without emphasizing the vertical non-proliferation of these weapons. The circumstances are ripe now for a build-down of nuclear arsenals with a view to their total elimination. The attraction of nuclear weapons will lose its appeal if all those States already possessing such weapons take convincing steps which will demonstrate that these weapons are not the monopoly of a few. Without doing so at the earliest opportunity, the 1995 Conference on the review and extension of the NPT could witness a polarization of views between the non-nuclear-weapon States and the nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty. In our view, the NPT did not permanently delineate the two categories of States parties to this Treaty, otherwise the relevant articles on nuclear disarmament would be without value. Furthermore, we have never subscribed to the idea that nuclear weapons are good for some and bad for others. We have always been convinced that they are bad for all. I should like to point out that the Kenya Government, like all other States parties, supports fully the extension of the Treaty, but we shall pay keen attention to all arguments advocating a limited or indefinite and unconditional extension of the Treaty. As I have already pointed out above, the NPT has witnessed the accession of additional States parties from Africa. This is a development that reinforces the rejection of nuclear weapons by numerous African States.

Circumstances appear ripe now for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone covering the whole of the African continent. In trying to achieve this objective, the experience of those who have successfully established such zones in their regions will be beneficial to African countries. We hope that when the process of implementing this objective commences, all States, including nuclear-weapon States, will support the African countries. I hope too this subject can gain greater attention in this Conference.

(Mr. Don Nanjira, Kenya)

The report of the Secretary-General of the United Nations entitled "New dimensions of arms regulation and disarmament in the post-cold-war era" is timely and deserves detailed examination, and I wish on behalf of this delegation to address myself to some of the issues raised in that report. The concepts of integration, globalization and revitalization as reflected in the said report require careful consideration. We share the view expressed in the report that global disarmament measures should be closely coordinated with efforts in other fields. The suggested link between disarmament and development should be amplified to underline that international peace and security will be unattainable if the socio-economic objectives of many developing countries remain unfulfilled as a result of continued over-expenditure of very scarce resources on various types of armaments. We feel that the time has come for a renewed look at the question of the relationship between disarmament and development, taking into account the vast changes that have taken place since 1987 when the International Conference on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development was held. My delegation would have wished that the report gave a more detailed treatment of this topic, to which we attach the greatest of importance. We want this item to be revitalized in this Conference, and my delegation will be presenting a proposal in due course on this very topic.

As is noted in the Secretary-General's report, the United Nations has gained vast experience in peace-keeping and peace-building operations in various parts of the world, including Africa, and this underlines the supremacy of the United Nations in facilitating the resolution of various conflicts. Of course we cannot downplay the importance of regional efforts in implementing the efforts of the United Nations.

The globalization of the disarmament process is now more important than it was in the past. A multilateral approach to disarmament has already been strengthened by regional and subregional disarmament initiatives. There are some regions where the prevailing political circumstances and mutual trust have led to impressive achievements in arms limitation and confidence-building measures. There are other regions, however, where political tensions and mutual suspicion have led to a deadly arms race. The difficult challenge then to the reinvigorated United Nations system and other international organizations, as stated in the Secretary-General's report, is to assist in the globalization of disarmament through encouragement of interregional interactions which will have to take into account the different history, culture and political dynamics of the various regions.

The Secretary-General stresses the need to build on the past achievements in the disarmament and arms control process, and this stress has the fullest support of the Kenyan delegation. As is noted in his report, there exists today an impressive number of global, regional and bilateral agreements, all of which were achieved during the cold war era. Taking into account the circumstances under which some of these global multilateral treaties were concluded, perhaps there is a need to improve some of these treaties which have serious loopholes, and here we have in mind the Biological Weapons Convention, which would be complemented with a verification regime, as has

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been pointed out in the past. We are of course aware that it is up to States parties to the various international agreements to decide on the types of improvements required to strengthen the treaties they are parties to.

I have already mentioned the Kenya Government's support for efforts aimed at the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. We also support the principle of non-proliferation in general, but this should not be to the detriment of States genuinely desiring to acquire dual-use technologies for peaceful purposes. Nuclear disarmament is another topic we would have liked to see a more detailed treatment of in the Secretary-General's report. The report does, however, mention the need to have disarmament machinery that would be a departure from the framework established during the cold war. We agree with this approach and with the proposal to have greater Security Council involvement in disarmament matters, and in particular in the enforcement of non-proliferation measures. This enforcement should be perceived to be just and applied uniformly without departing from the mandate of the Security Council as laid down in the Charter of the United Nations, and it should not diminish the competence of other bodies that deal with disarmament issues.

We have taken note of the fact that the First Committee of the General Assembly, the Disarmament Commission and the Conference on Disarmament have undertaken efforts to respond to the new circumstances by adapting their structures, methods of work and functions to fit in with the new realities. Here in the Conference, consultations have indicated the need for this body to address its agenda and membership. We consider the decision by the Conference to establish subsidiary bodies on a nuclear test ban, the prevention of an arms race in outer space, negative security assurances and transparency in armaments as a response to the new realities. We hope that concrete progress will be achieved in the near future on all or some of these issues. We share the view that nuclear issues on the agenda of the Conference still remain priority issues. My delegation should take the liberty to discuss these important issues in the plenary and subsidiary bodies established to consider issues of the nuclear test ban and negative security assurances pending the final outcome of the consultations on the agenda of the Conference.

As to the membership of the Conference, we note that an increasing number of countries have applied for such membership and some of these countries have been waiting for many years for a decision on their applications. We are convinced the time has come to make a final decision on this matter and we shall participate in the envisaged consultations on it in an open and constructive spirit and we would support expansion of a limited nature that would not impair the efficient and effective functioning of the Conference as a single multilateral negotiating body in disarmament matters, but, as I have indicated above, we are ready to discuss this item constructively at any time that it is brought up for our deliberation.

(Mr. Don Nanjira, Kenya)

With the completion of the draft chemical weapons convention, the Conference vindicated itself as an effective multilateral negotiating vehicle, and we hope that with this new momentum and as it focuses more clearly on issues which hold a lot of promise for success, it will achieve even more impressive results. We are encouraged by the developments and hope that similar successes can occur in the other disarmament fields in the future.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Kenya for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to myself and also to Ambassador Berasategui. I now give the floor to the representative of Germany, Ambassador Hoffmann.

Mr. HOFFMANN (Germany): Today I would like to give a few comments on our second report, that is, on the CD reform, and this time I promise to be brief. It has already been stated here that we are in a decisive phase of our work. The consensus on the chemical weapons Convention has demonstrated to the world that the Conference on Disarmament measures up to its mandate of elaborating binding global arms control agreements. The smooth start of this year's substantive work also augurs well for the tasks ahead. We must devote our full attention to the new challenges before us in order to justify the confidence placed in us. The pragmatic and pertinent statements we have heard so far in the plenary meetings of this annual session bear out my optimism that we will succeed. It is clear to me from these statements that our shared objective is to concentrate on the priority issues on the international arms control agenda. At the same time, we must endorse the legitimacy of our forum, the Conference on Disarmament, by finding an appropriate solution to the question of expansion. Let me first comment on the question of our agenda.

To begin with, I would like to emphasize that the agenda question should be approached in a spirit of pragmatism and flexibility. This year's swift decision on the work of subsidiary bodies has been a telling example of how efficiently such a spirit can produce results acceptable to all. Our review of the agenda should lead to a result which allows for continuous adjustment of the agenda to the needs of a constantly changing world. I would like to suggest that neither the Final Document of the first SSOD nor our own rules of procedure stand in the way of such a flexible attitude. Rather the contrary seems to be the case: we are free to adopt each year a revised or even new agenda taking into account recommendations by the General Assembly, proposals made in our Conference, and decisions emanating from it. This seems to indicate that we should rather reassess our priorities each year than simply carry forward one "eternal" agenda from year to year as we have done in the past.

Regarding the substance of future yearly agendas, my Government's general point of departure will hardly be a surprise: arms control negotiations should not be considered as an end in themselves but as a means to further peace and security. Peace and security in the real world begins with preventing and solving conflicts, of which we see too many around us. If arms control and disarmament negotiations cannot contribute to preventing,

(Mr. Hoffmann, Germany)

mitigating or solving real conflicts in the real world, such negotiations will run the risk of failing the litmus test of legitimacy. In my plenary statement on 2 February, in the context of the Secretary-General's report on "New dimensions of arms regulation and disarmament", I submitted some ideas on how this conceptual starting-point might be translated into concrete agenda items.

Let me now turn to the question of membership in this forum - or, more precisely, the question of expansion of the CD, because it is only expansion that we are really considering. In the last 14 years, that is to say since it commenced work in its present form in 1979, the Conference's membership has not increased. It has even actually fallen due to various developments. One of these developments - German unification - has been very gratifying for my country. From a Geneva perspective, however, the actual shrinking of the CD membership has lent particular urgency to the search for a solution to the question of expansion, which has eluded us for too long.

Conceptually speaking, there seem to be four possible ways to solve the problem, which I would like to comment upon briefly. Firstly, we might in theory develop certain topical criteria in order to identify those countries that should participate in global disarmament and arms control negotiations. However, as already convincingly argued in the previous President's report of 8 December 1992, such an abstract discussion would hardly offer a practical way out. Secondly, the least complicated solution might seem to be to declare the Conference open-ended - to let every State participate whenever it deems it appropriate. This approach might lead more quickly to an expansion, but it would also make efforts for result-oriented negotiations under the consensus rule much more difficult. Thirdly, a political "expansion package", based on a mixture of political as well as geographical balance. This approach has worked in the past; it might work again. If it did, we should certainly make use of such a chance and manage the expansion accordingly.

However, we should not underestimate the difficulties in the process of brokering such a package. It will not be as easily attainable as in the past, since today's world is not as neatly partitioned any more, but has become a much more complex world. Fourthly, the opening of the Conference to all those who have a genuine interest in its proceedings. This would mean membership for all States which apply to join and are ready to participate in the work. Such an approach does not imply "uncontrolled growth" of the Conference. One week ago, Sir Michael Weston put forward some interesting proposals on how to manage applications in order to keep expansion limited. We could also think about procedural adjustments in order to ensure a smooth negotiating process and the Conference's effective functioning. Of course, I am not thinking here of relinquishing the rule of consensus, the basic principle of our work. I believe, however, that consensus should be reserved to decisions on results and not be allowed to block discussion.

(Mr. Hoffmann, Germany)

Germany's assessment of the membership question takes the political importance of the Conference's work as the point of departure: disarmament and arms control is a global concern of utmost importance. My Government would consider it unfortunate if countries which are really willing and ready to contribute to this endeavour were excluded from full participation in the only multilateral negotiating body. This is why, of the four concepts for expansion commented upon before, Germany prefers the last one.

The PRESIDENT: I thank Ambassador Hoffmann for sharing his thoughts on these important matters with us. I am sure that the two special coordinators, who unfortunately are not present today, will get the message. I now give the floor to the representative of Egypt, Ambassador Zahran.

Mr. ZAHNAN (Egypt) (translated from Arabic): Mr. President, allow me first to express my satisfaction at seeing you presiding over the Conference on Disarmament with your well-known skill and efficiency, which enabled the Conference to agree on its agenda and programme of work for its 1993 session at quite an early stage of the session. I would like to express to Ambassador Servais of Belgium my heartfelt gratitude for the commendable efforts he made during his presidency of the CD. My gratitude also goes to the Secretary-General and Personal Representative of the United Nations Secretary-General, Ambassador Vicente Berasategui, and his staff, whose efforts assisted us in expediting the proceedings of the CD. It is equally a source of pleasure for me to welcome our new colleagues who have recently taken their place around this table - Ambassador Hoffmann of Germany, Ambassador Boytha of Hungary, Ambassador Chandra of India, Ambassador Don Nanjira of Kenya and Ambassador Norberg of Sweden. I wish all of them a successful mission and assure them of my full cooperation.

I take the floor today in order to lay before the Conference the views of my delegation on the report of the Secretary-General entitled "New dimensions of arms regulation and disarmament in the post-cold-war era". I would also like to touch upon the issue of the improved functioning of the Conference, in response to General Assembly decision 47/422. I am confident that these views together with those of other members of the Conference on Disarmament will be reflected faithfully in its report to the upcoming resumed session of the First Committee in New York next March.

Egypt will elaborate its national views in New York through a national paper which will give our views on the Secretary-General's report. However, I wish here to express some of our preliminary views in the course of the deliberations of the Conference on this issue and on the basis of General Assembly resolution 47/54 E. You will remember that in his statement before this Conference on 28 January 1993, the Foreign Minister of Egypt welcomed the report of the Secretary-General, and said: "The report makes a number of interesting proposals and suggestions, which Egypt will address in detail through the appropriate channels. I would like to highlight however that we fully support the conclusion reached that 'a globalization of the process of arms control and disarmament is now needed'. We believe that your

(Mr. Zahran, Egypt)

Conference in particular has an invaluable role to play in giving tangible expression to the thought, and hope to see an active role for your Conference in developing the disarmament agenda for the twenty-first century."

On this basis, Egypt is convinced that the approach adopted by the Secretary-General forms a firm starting-point from which progress in the field of disarmament can gain momentum. In this respect, we believe that the implementation of the recommendations contained in the 1978 Final Document of the special session devoted to disarmament, which formed an agenda for general and complete disarmament, is invaluable as it lays the ground for the realization on a practical level of the Secretary-General's proposals for integration, globalization and revitalization.

We still believe that the highest priority must be given to nuclear disarmament and the prevention of a nuclear arms race, in conformity with the United Nations Declaration on the Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear and Thermo-nuclear Weapons adopted by the General Assembly in resolution 1653 (XVI). It is also our firm view that non-nuclear-weapon States should be provided with necessary and sufficient guarantees against the use of this type of nuclear weapon in addition to those provided by Security Council resolution 255. We hope that the parties concerned will soon agree to a comprehensive ban on nuclear testing. We believe that by choosing to address nuclear weapons as the first specific category of weapons in his report, the Secretary-General accurately reflected the priority that must be given to this issue.

With respect to chemical weapons, we fully share the Secretary-General's view that the chemical weapons Convention is an indispensable element in global efforts to deal effectively with weapons of mass destruction.

It must be emphasized, however, that having signed and ratified the NPT but not signed the chemical weapons Convention so far, we are not missing the opportunity to "rid, as a first step, the Middle East region from chemical weapons", but rather safeguarding our vital security interests, as one State in the region has not committed itself to acceding to the NPT. Our views on this subject are well known and have been stated most recently by the Foreign Minister of Egypt before the Conference on Disarmament on 28 January 1993. Let me only reiterate our firm commitment to the establishment of a zone free of weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East, be they nuclear, chemical or biological.

On the issue of transparency, we once again agree with the Secretary-General when he states that, when properly applied, it can be conducive to confidence-building among States and helpful in alerting the global community to excessive accumulations of armaments. In our view, the expression "properly applied" means applied equally and without discrimination to all States, all regions and all categories of weapon, including weapons of mass destruction. It should also be applied to national production and stockpiles, whether the stockpiles are conventional armaments or weapons of mass destruction. Selectivity in applying transparency would be tantamount to discrimination and would be an exercise in futility.

(Mr. Zahran, Egypt)

The United Nations, whose role and responsibilities in the promotion of disarmament need to be strengthened, must play its part in ensuring that the international disarmament agenda, at the top of which stand weapons of mass destruction and nuclear weapons in particular, is applied globally without exceptions or discrimination. The concept of security in the world we live in today is an indivisible whole. Disarmament and security are intrinsically linked, and therefore any imbalance at any of the three basic levels of security, national, regional or international, is bound to have adverse repercussions at the other two. Furthermore, adequate levels of social and economic development are essential for a stable security environment, particularly in the developing world. It is therefore of the utmost importance that more effort should be made to determine ways and means of channelling the savings achieved as a result of the implementation of disarmament agreements to finance development programmes in developing countries.

With regard to the section of the Secretary-General's report concerning the Conference on Disarmament, we fully agree that the time has come to take practical actions with regard to a number of issues which are facing the Conference. One of the proposals made by the Secretary-General in his report, namely that the Conference might focus its efforts on well-defined and urgent issues, is already being implemented. At its 1993 session the Conference decided to give attention to four specific issues for which ad hoc committees have been created, as follows: a nuclear test ban; the prevention of an arms race in outer space; negative security assurances; and transparency in armaments. With regard to the agenda of the Conference, we still maintain that priority must be given to all nuclear items. As stated earlier, we believe that it is no coincidence that the first specific category of weapons addressed by the Secretary-General in his report was nuclear weapons. This is a reflection of the determination of the international community, as the Secretary-General said in his report, to intensify disarmament efforts in this field, the nuclear field.

On the issue of coordination, we appreciate the Secretary-General's idea for increased coordination among the various bodies involved in the field of disarmament, particularly the Conference on Disarmament as the only negotiating body in the field of disarmament, on the one hand, and the United Nations Disarmament Commission as a deliberative organ on the other hand. It is an idea which deserves careful study. We have no doubt that complementarity and harmonization between the work of these two bodies would be most useful in the inter-sessional period prior to the submission of their respective reports to the General Assembly through its First Committee. Furthermore, and in connection with enhanced coordination, the Conference of Disarmament could benefit from the services of UNIDIR. Being based in Geneva, UNIDIR could, without losing its independence, render invaluable assistance to the Conference by studying certain fields and conducting research when requested to do so. This would facilitate and expedite the deliberations of the Conference in negotiating various disarmament instruments.

(Mr. Zahran, Egypt)

As far as the question of membership of the Conference on Disarmament is concerned, in accordance with resolution 47/54 E, we believe that the Conference should not be excluded from the process of democratization of international relations. States which are interested in becoming members of the Conference and which are in a position to contribute to its work should not be excluded, provided that equitable geographical balance is maintained in its membership.

Closely related to the question of membership is that of decision-making. We believe that if the Conference on Disarmament is to play a significant and effective role in the field of disarmament, we should consider the principle of consensus and whether it can be regarded as synonymous with unanimity, as is the view of some, or whether it is synonymous with the veto of the minority. We could also consider the possibility that decisions on procedural matters might be taken by a majority, as was said by the distinguished Minister for Foreign Affairs of Sweden, to whom we listened in the last meeting.

The PRESIDENT: I thank Ambassador Zahran for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the representative of Mongolia, Ambassador Yumjav.

Mr. YUMJAV (Mongolia): Mr. President, at the outset allow me to associate myself with those who have already congratulated you on your assumption of the presidency of the Conference on Disarmament. I am confident that your wide diplomatic experience and high competence will ensure the success of our work. A clear example of your efficient guidance of our deliberations is the smooth start of the business of the Conference, namely the establishment of the four ad hoc committees on such important items as NTB, prevention of an arms race in outer space, negative security assurances and transparency in armaments, without losing time on procedural debates. I would also like to pay tribute to your predecessor, Ambassador Michel Servais of Belgium, for his valuable contribution to our work during his presidency. My sincere thanks also go to the Secretary-General of the Conference on Disarmament and Personal Representative of the United Nations Secretary-General, Ambassador Vicente Berasategui, and to his staff, for their important contribution to the cause of disarmament. Let me as well take this opportunity to welcome warmly our new colleagues, Ambassador Lanús of Argentina, Ambassador Hoffmann of Germany, Ambassador Boytha of Hungary, Ambassador Chandra of India, Ambassador Don Nanjira of Kenya, Ambassador Norberg of Sweden, and wish them every success in their new endeavours.

In my intervention today I wish to present the views of my Government on some issues raised by the Secretary-General in his report "New dimensions of arms regulation and disarmament in the post-cold-war era", as well as on the question of the future of the CD. Mongolia welcomes the report of the Secretary-General as a timely call for the international community to appraise and revitalize the international disarmament process in the context of recent changes in the global security environment. It adequately supplements his

(Mr. Yumjav, Mongolia)

report entitled "An agenda for peace". Taken together, these two documents provide a broad conceptual framework to enhance the United Nations overall capabilities to maintain international peace and security.

The fundamental changes that have occurred in international relations brought along the collapse of the bi-polar structure of the world and helped to ease tensions in various troubled spots of the world. But the world today is still far from being a peaceful, just and secure place. Conflicts, tensions, mistrust and lack of respect for the rule of law and more importantly the underlying causes of their existence still persist in the world. As it is rightly pointed out in the report, "the shadows of the weaponry of mass destruction still loom large; the threat of weapons proliferation - be it nuclear, chemical or conventional - still exists; the trade in weapons is again gaining momentum; and military expenditures in many parts of the world are still far too excessive in relation to unmet human needs" (para. 9). The cold war may be over but the weapons and armaments are still here and the goals of their eradication are still to be achieved.

We subscribe to the main thrust of the report embodied in the intertwined concepts of integration, globalization and revitalization. Obviously the practical implementation of these concepts should be carefully thought of and agreed on. The Secretary-General's belief that disarmament efforts "should be closely coordinated with efforts in other fields and should be seen as part of the larger network of international cooperative behaviour ..." is fully shared (para. 10). While recognizing the close inter-correlation between disarmament and other political and economic issues, including the fundamental problem of development, it would also be useful to point out that due to the sensitive nature of matters discussed and complex technical factors involved, the disarmament process enjoys some relative autonomy and cannot be tied up with the discussion of other problems or artificial time-frames.

Mongolia shares the view that each and every State should be engaged in the process of disarmament and strive to make its contribution to its success. Mutually supplementary unilateral actions, bilateral agreements and multilateral arrangements at both global and regional level constitute a basic framework for the promotion of the globalization in disarmament affairs.

The regional approach to disarmament issues, balanced interrelationship between global, regional and subregional efforts are of great importance as well. We support the identification by the Secretary-General of the questions of conventional armaments and confidence-building measures as important items on the regional and subregional disarmament agenda.

It is true that disarmament is every State's business, but it is equally true that some States bear particularly enhanced responsibilities in making the world a less armed and safer world. In this regard Mongolia welcomes the ongoing process of bilateral nuclear arms reduction, anticipates further achievements in this field and expects other nuclear-weapon Powers to join the process.

(Mr. Yumjav, Mongolia)

In our view, the building of a new international security system merits closer examination on the basis of existing mechanisms in the area of international peace and security. We fully concur with the Secretary-General's view that the existing system of disarmament agreements and treaties provide "a solid foundation to build upon now that the conditions for progress in this field have been enhanced" (para. 20).

Mongolia supports in principle the main priorities in the field of disarmament set forth in the Secretary-General's report. Now the chemical weapons Convention, an important milestone in the global disarmament process, is finally concluded. We believe that efforts of the international community should be concentrated on such issues as NTB, non-proliferation of weapons, especially nuclear weapons, negative security assurances for non-nuclear-weapon States, conventional armaments and confidence-building measures.

We are of the opinion that despite some of its "contentious aspects" the non-proliferation Treaty is the cornerstone of the existing non-proliferation regime and therefore its verification and safeguard arrangements need to be strengthened. At its 1995 review conference the NPT should be extended indefinitely. We are convinced that all States should adhere to the Treaty.

Transparency in armaments and the regulation of arms transfers are important issues in facilitating non-proliferation. In this context we welcome the Secretary-General's intention to do everything in the Organization's competence to make the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms an efficient and successful service for Member States.

The section devoted to conversion highlights some of the so-called post-disarmament problems which clearly deserve the special attention of the international community. The decision to establish an interdepartmental task force at the United Nations designed to help provide Member States with political, technical and economic advice on various aspects involved in the transition to a post-disarmament world is a highly commendable development.

The reassessment and possible adjustment of the existing United Nations disarmament framework to the new realities and priorities as suggested in paragraph 43 necessarily requires a clear and agreed definition of these new realities and priorities. In general, the United Nations disarmament machinery works and produces results. The introduction of changes in the United Nations disarmament machinery should be a matter of careful consideration in various organs concerned.

Proper acknowledgement should be given to the sustained efforts by both the Disarmament Commission and the First Committee to rationalize and streamline their respective procedures and work, as well as a decision of the Conference on Disarmament to review its agenda, membership and methods of work.

(Mr. Yumjav, Mongolia)

I will now turn to the question of the future of the CD, in particular, the issues of its membership and agenda. Mongolia firmly believes that the status of the CD should remain as a single multilateral negotiating body on disarmament. The successful conclusion of the chemical weapons Convention has once again proved the efficacy of the CD, as well as the importance of its further existence. At the same time, we are for the improved and effective functioning of the CD, including its membership and agenda, taking into account the radical changes which have occurred in international relations in recent years.

My delegation shares the view that the CD still retains the structure and agenda of the cold war era. Therefore, we subscribe to the United Nations Secretary-General's proposal that a comprehensive approach is needed to address the structure, functions, methods of work and working agenda of the CD. Moreover, members and non-members of the Conference who participated in the consultations which have so far been carried out have also shown wide recognition of the immediate solution to these problems, in particular membership in the CD. We feel that the composition of the CD should be realistic and balanced, owing to its negotiating character. The chemical weapons Convention has demonstrated that it is quite possible to produce an agreement of a global nature, even within the present structure of the CD. For that reason, my delegation is not in favour of the excessive expansion of CD membership. Such expansion, in our view, could lead to the undermining of the rule of consensus, and thus the efficiency of the Conference. However, we consider that the aspirations of those who wish to make a contribution to the work of the Conference should be duly recognized. Consequently, the Mongolian delegation is in favour of expanding the present CD by approximately 20 members. I feel this is a reasonable approach, as the expanded CD would then comprise about 60 members - or a third of the entire United Nations membership.

Turning back to the rule of consensus, I would like to underscore that this is a key element in a multilateral negotiating body, such as the CD. The CD conducts its deliberations by consensus, thus providing a mechanism to protect national security interests. That is why we are for preserving that rule.

In spite of the fact that the existing groupings of the CD do not fully correspond to today's realities, in our view, political and geographical balance in the CD has not lost its significance. In order to produce a global security agreement, it is extremely important to consolidate the interests of both big and small States, whether or not they possess nuclear weapons, as well as those of regions and subregions. Therefore, we do not wish to make the CD "a club of the powerful", since the arms race threatens the security of all nations, including small ones. Mongolia is convinced that, notwithstanding the specific problems related to the current lack of necessary human and financial resources, the continued participation of relatively small States in the work of the CD is vital to ensure the balanced representation of the world in this single negotiating body.

(Mr. Yumjav, Mongolia)

The Mongolian delegations supports the United Nations Secretary-General's view that the efforts of the CD might be focused on well-defined and urgent issues. I am convinced that in coming years the priority agenda items in the CD will be NTB, negative security assurances, transparency in armaments and outer space. In our view, another pressing issue to be addressed in the CD is non-proliferation in all its dimensions. We believe that such important issues as regional disarmament and confidence-building measures should also be included in the agenda of the Conference. My delegation has no objection that certain questions on the present agenda of the CD be merged and restructured, as suggested, for example, by our Swedish colleague.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Mongolia for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the representative of Ukraine, Ambassador Sliptchenko.

Mr. SLIPTCHENKO (Ukraine) (translated from Russian): Mr. President, it is a great pleasure for me, speaking for the first time in this extremely important organ of international cooperation, to congratulate you on behalf of the delegation of Ukraine, on the excellent job that you have done in fulfilling the difficult tasks of being President during such an arduous period of work of this session. Allow me also to express the hope that, under your leadership, our joint work will be marked by a major contribution to the historic process of limiting and reducing armaments and disarmament, for which today there is a fundamentally new and favourable opportunity.

It is a particular pleasure for me to emphasize this aspect since both before it recently won its independence and since then, my country has proclaimed for all to hear the achievement of neutral and non-nuclear status as its highest political goal. And not only because since then Ukraine has in the most active way been moving towards the achievement of that goal and has constructively participated in all negotiating machinery in this field. I am also pleased to speak of this because nobody today can accuse us of not undertaking all the necessary practical measures deriving from the appropriate agreements. Suffice it to recall in this connection the early withdrawal from the Ukraine of the entire arsenal of tactical nuclear missiles for subsequent dismantling and destruction. Today we are talking about the next step, ratification of the Treaty on the limitation and reduction of strategic offensive arms and the Lisbon Protocol thereto so that, by assuming all the obligations deriving from them, we can rid ourselves completely of all types of nuclear weapons.

There is no need to refer once again to the tremendous importance and international significance of this step by a State which, as one of the official successor States to the former USSR, has assumed its share of responsibility for the third largest nuclear potential in the world today. Perhaps it might seem the simplest of decisions if we simply renounced such responsibility and shifted it to someone else. However, in our view, that would be unlikely to help strengthen stability in the world and achieve the goal which we have set ourselves (and I particularly wish to emphasize this

(Mr. Sliptchenko, Ukraine)

aspect - that we did so ourselves, voluntarily): not just achieving a reduction, even a large reduction, in our nuclear arsenal, but ensuring its complete and irreversible destruction.

The political leaders and the parliament of Ukraine, fully realizing their historic responsibility to mankind and our own people, are taking a very serious approach to the question of the ratification of the START Treaty and the Protocol, as well as subsequent accession to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, while trying to ensure that proper account is taken of all the related international and national factors. Unfortunately this seriousness and sense of responsibility in our approach is not always understood by our partners. In this connection, it is a particular honour for me today to present as an official document of the Conference the text of a recent statement delivered by the President of Ukraine at the World Economic Forum in Davos on "How to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons", which contains a detailed explanation of Ukraine's position. I would ask you, Sir, to take the necessary steps to ensure that this document is circulated during today's meeting.

As it is clear from this statement - and incidentally this has already been noted more than once, inter alia, at the highest level - Ukraine's position in this matter is clear and unambiguous. The President of Ukraine, believing that ratification of the START Treaty and accession to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons are in the highest interests of the State, has sent a proposal along these lines to Parliament, where intensive hearings on this matter are now taking place. That this aspect is complex and has many aspects is shown by the fact that in this connection Parliament has set up a whole range of groups of experts to deal with the military-political aspects of nuclear disarmament, the political-legal questions of destroying nuclear weapons, scientific and technical problems of nuclear disarmament, financial and economic problems of disarmament, problems of environmental security, and social and psychological problems facing military personnel from missile units. Their activities are coordinated by a special working group of deputies. Last week plenary sessions of the seventh session of Parliament began. Its programme of work officially includes the question of the ratification of the START I Treaty. The deputies are considering all necessary documents, analysing the domestic and foreign situation and financial problems and giving particular attention to questions related to the provision of security guarantees to Ukraine.

A few days ago the first round of talks took place between the delegations of Ukraine and the Russian Federation with a view to settling all questions related to ratification of the START Treaty and also ensuring the nuclear and environmental security of strategic nuclear forces in Russia and Ukraine. Progress has been achieved at the talks in preparing a draft agreement on carrying out surveillance of the operation of strategic nuclear force missile complexes from the point of view of guarantees and of design. It was agreed that ad hoc working groups will consider various scenarios for the dismantling, transport and destruction of nuclear warheads and elements of

(Mr. Sliptchenko, Ukraine)

missile complexes of the strategic nuclear forces deployed in Ukraine, including the question of reprocessing nuclear components. These talks will be continued.

In short, difficult and serious work is being done in keeping with the far-reaching and important nature of the instruments in question. Of course, this will take some time. Of course, the scale of the tasks confronting us in this area will require major - and not just moral, but also material - support by the international community. And here we are encouraged by the rather favourable response, including the response received at the Davos forum, concerning the idea that we have put forward for setting up a special international fund for nuclear disarmament. Thus - and here I venture to repeat myself - what is taking place now is a large-scale, serious operation taking into account the full measure of our responsibility and the whole range of accompanying domestic and international factors. However, as Ukrainian President L.M. Kravchuk emphasized on the eve of his recent official visit to Great Britain, there is now no reason to change the course we have chosen. Ukraine is striving to become a non-nuclear Power. In this effort we proceed from the principle that the world as a whole must move as soon as possible towards complete nuclear disarmament, and peoples must properly evaluate not only the search for approaches to specific reductions in national nuclear arsenals, but also the policies of those States that are voluntarily seeking a completely non-nuclear status.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Ukraine for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair. The document he referred to has already been circulated to this plenary. I now give the floor to the representative of Belarus, Ambassador Mardovitch.

Mr. MARDOVITCH (Belarus) (translated from Russian): First of all allow me to congratulate you warmly, Mr. President, on your election to the responsible post of President of the Conference. Your diplomatic skill and professionalism will certainly help you find necessary compromises and successfully complete the work of this session by adopting important decisions. We also express our gratitude to the Secretary-General, Ambassador Berasategui, and his staff for the preparation of the session.

I would now like to inform the participants in this session of an extremely important event which has taken place in the life of Belarus, which the Foreign Ministry of the Republic notified to all embassies accredited to Minsk in a note dated 5 February of this year. That note reads:

"On 4 February 1993 the Supreme Soviet of the Republic of Belarus ratified the Treaty of 31 July 1991 between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms and the Protocol thereto signed in Lisbon on 25 May 1992, and also took a decision concerning accession by the Republic of Belarus to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons as a non-nuclear State.

(Mr. Mardovitch, Belarus)

"These decisions were adopted as the expression of the consistent policy of the Republic of Belarus aimed at achieving the status of a non-nuclear and neutral State. For the first time in the history of the international community a sovereign State has voluntarily renounced the possibility of actual possession of nuclear arms. In taking this unprecedented step, the Republic of Belarus expects that the world community will support its peace-loving policy and its desire to make a meaningful contribution to strengthening European and global security.

"Of all the successor States to the former USSR as regards the START Treaty, Belarus is the first and only country to have stated its readiness to implement in full its obligations under the Lisbon Protocol. The fact that Belarus has ratified these treaties without any conditions or reservations has once again demonstrated the consistent and constructive nature of its foreign policy.

"The voting in the Supreme Soviet of Belarus proves that the policy of seeking neutral and non-nuclear status is supported by parliamentarians of all factions. The decision on ratifying the Treaty and the Lisbon Protocol was adopted virtually unanimously (one deputy voted against).

"The Republic of Belarus expects that its attitude towards nuclear disarmament issues will be duly appreciated by the international community, and it has the right to count on all-round financial assistance in dealing with the entire range of questions pertaining to the practical realization of the obligations it has assumed under treaties, as well as in effecting the conversion of military industries and modernization of technologies."

Mr. President, I would ask you to consider this statement by the Belarusian Foreign Ministry as an official document of this session of the Conference on Disarmament.

We view the decisions taken by the Supreme Soviet of Belarus not as a simple act or as a "moment of truth" but rather as a goal which has emerged from the depths of the consciousness of the Belarusian people during its tragic history. The movement towards neutrality and non-nuclear status in our view is a process of strengthening the independence and sovereignty of Belarus. The Republic of Belarus has been recognized by more than 100 States around the world, and diplomatic relations have been established with more than 60 of them. Our State has become a full-fledged participant in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe and a member of the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank and other international financial institutions, and serves as host to a department of UNDP. All tactical nuclear weapons have been withdrawn from Belarusian territory. In addition, Belarus has undertaken to withdraw strategic weapons over a period of seven years. It may be that this will take place even sooner. We have distanced ourselves from participation in military and military-political

(Mr. Mardovitch, Belarus)

alliances and blocs. All of this is creating a sort of springboard, a basis for the actual implementation of the constitutional principles of neutrality and non-nuclear status.

At the same time, I would like to draw attention to the following problems. First, an attitude of comprehension is needed to the fact that the safety of nuclear weapons will pose a problem for as long as they remain on Belarusian territory. Secondly, ways and means must be found to increase the allocations under the Nunn-Lugar Act to seek other sources of finance for programmes for monitoring radiation levels, and the purchase of equipment and supplies used for accidents and emergencies. Thirdly, provision must be made for the possibility of allocating funds for administrative and technical measures to prevent the illegal export of uranium and the unauthorized spread of sensitive technologies transiting the territory of Belarus, as well as the need to establish special technical equipment at border crossings and customs posts in the Republic of Belarus. Fourthly, provision must be made for the possibility of providing assistance for retraining and social adaption of military personnel in strategic units which remain on Belarusian territory after the withdrawal of the nuclear and strategic forces of the former USSR. Fifthly, it must be borne in mind that Belarus expects its share of the proceeds from any sale of uranium removed from nuclear warheads. It is important to note that the Republic of Belarus is not seeking physical possession of fissionable materials but simply fair financial compensation. Sixthly, it must be remembered that Belarus, having embarked on the difficult path towards neutrality and genuine freedom from nuclear weapons, is interested in obtaining additional security guarantees from the nuclear Powers.

As it moves towards a better future, the Republic of Belarus is deliberately shedding the layers of the past, leaving behind the burden of old stereotypes and prejudices which have not stood the test of time. We face with confidence the opportunities which are opening up, and will contribute to ensuring international security and fostering the constructive efforts of the international community.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Belarus for his statement and for the kind words addressed to the Chair. The secretariat has also received the communication referred to by the Ambassador of Belarus, and it will be circulated as soon as possible.

(continued in Spanish)

I have pleasure in giving the floor to Ambassador Arteaga of Venezuela.

Mr. ARTEAGA (Venezuela) (translated from Spanish): We convey our sincere congratulations to you, Mr. President, and our admiration at the skilful and effective way in which you have conducted the work of the Conference on Disarmament, which has facilitated the achievement of very expeditious agreements in the organization of our work, so that we truly congratulate you. We also express our gratitude to the previous President, Ambassador Michel Servais of Belgium. We welcome the new ambassadors who have joined the work of the Conference and we also convey our congratulations to Ambassador Vicente Berasategui on his efficient performance at the helm of the secretariat.

The end of the cold war has paved the way for the adoption of new approaches aimed at comprehensively coming to grips with the old and new problems facing the international community. The encouraging panorama that seemed to mark the beginnings of a new era has been clouded by the appearance of some areas of conflict, whose manifestations tend to reflect the complexities and difficulties which we must overcome in shaping a new system of international relations. The present international circumstances underline the need to adopt an integral approach to the difficulties linked to peace and well-being. A world in which over half the population lives in poverty and a minority enjoys high standards of living can be neither stable nor safe; stability must not be interpreted as a form of stagnation or the consolidation of a problem-ridden world order. An evolving world should be open to the influence of political wisdom and systematic respect for international law.

In the light of the changes that have occurred in recent years, we have been listening to ideas and reflections on the role to be played by the Conference on Disarmament in this post-cold-war era. Some sceptics have cast doubt on the importance of this body as a multilateral disarmament forum, on the grounds that disarmament constitutes a process related to bipolarity, whose significance has diminished in view of the need to tackle more urgent tasks; the dangers inherent in the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the excessive build-up of conventional armaments negate this type of argument and conjecture. The adoption of the Convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons has once again stressed the importance of this Conference.

We should like to refer to the report of the Secretary-General on "New dimensions of arms regulation and disarmament in the post-cold-war era" (A/C.1/47/7). The report by Mr. Boutros Boutros-Ghali is of clear interest as it contains a number of ideas which Venezuela shares in general terms. Within this new approach the Secretary-General works with three concepts in dealing with this item - integration, globalization and revitalization. In respect of integration, while it is true, as the Secretary-General says, that "the connections which exist between disarmament and arms regulation on the one hand, and the political processes - in peace-keeping operations and consolidation of peace - that shape international behaviour are crucial to progress both in the field of disarmament and in the creation of a new system of international security", it is no less true that the formulation of this idea prompts doubts in our mind as to its clarity in view of the fact that disarmament, because of its own particular characteristics, requires genuine

(Mr. Arteaga, Venezuela)

and specialized machinery that cannot be applied in a similar and automatic way to processes related to peace-keeping operations, and vice versa. Truly, globalization is a concept for which the vast majority of countries have been struggling, since matters pertaining to international peace and security concern us all. Hence we remain convinced that the multilateral approach in consideration of disarmament should be the main pillar of our task, as it contains three principles of great importance: indivisibility, non-discrimination and broad reciprocity.

Our delegation recognizes the significance of the signature of bilateral agreements on the reduction of strategic arms and the adoption of unilateral measures recently; none the less we believe that the policy of arms control in more favourable circumstances for cooperation and dialogue should not replace disarmament as a means of strengthening peace. While agreeing that it is necessary to avoid handling disarmament matters in a compartmentalized manner, we also continue to believe that the paramount responsibility in the adoption of concrete disarmament measures continues to fall on the main military powers; the appropriateness of dealing with urgent issues in the sphere of disarmament should not lead us to avoid efforts to promote the elimination of certain categories of weapons of mass destruction such as nuclear weapons, and negotiations on an agreement for a total nuclear test ban.

There is no doubt that, within the context of globalization, Latin America attaches special importance to regional security agreements. It should be emphasized that in our region we adopted specific measures in favour of non-proliferation many years ago, including of course the Treaty of Tlatelolco and more recently our accession to the Convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons and its early entry into force. We hope it will turn our region into the first region free of weapons of mass destruction. I also consider it appropriate to emphasize the readiness of Argentina, Brazil and Chile to make an immediate contribution to the full entry into force of the Treaty of Tlatelolco.

In connection with the concept of revitalization we agree with the Secretary-General that within the context of this new era the recently concluded treaties should not constitute the epilogue to the efforts of the international community in favour of disarmament. On the contrary - they should be an encouragement to continued efforts to eradicate the causes feeding security dilemmas.

Certainly the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction has become a matter of great concern. Its handling requires the application of a two-dimensional approach combining the effective adoption of disarmament measures and the use of diplomacy in the broad sense of the term, through the holding of effective negotiations. Along these lines we consider that the adoption of an agreement on the prohibition of nuclear testing would have positive effects for the maintenance of international security. In view of the changes that have occurred in the international political scene, it is essential to discard perceptions linked to bipolarity; technical arguments

(Mr. Arteaga, Venezuela)

cannot continue to be used to justify nuclear testing. In any event we cannot fail to refer with satisfaction to the nuclear moratoriums declared by various Powers.

The extension of the nuclear non-proliferation Treaty will obviously depend on specific progress made on the question of nuclear testing. The establishment of a comprehensive regime in this sphere will contribute to the strengthening of the NPT. Venezuela believes that the idea of indefinite and unconditional extension of the NPT could perhaps undermine its foundations; hence we consider that its strengthening will have to be based on the need to adopt and especially put into practice reciprocal, non-discriminatory principles and the universal application of its provisions.

Although it is true that some partial measures (unilateral, bilateral, regional) could contribute to mitigating the risks of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, they should be accompanied by political measures designed to encourage universal accession to existing multilateral instruments such as the NPT, the Convention on bacteriological weapons, the entry into force of the Convention on chemical weapons. Concurrently with these global measures, it would be necessary to adopt a convention to prohibit the production and monitor the storage of fissionable materials - plutonium - and strengthen the IAEA system of safeguards as well as its inspection machinery. Likewise we encourage the nuclear-weapon States to continue negotiations in good faith in conformity with the provisions of the NPT.

As a consequence of the Gulf crisis it was demonstrated that the excessive build-up of armaments has disruptive effects for international security. The establishment of a United Nations Register of Conventional Arms is a positive measure in confidence-building. However, we believe that given the responsibility devolving on the main nuclear Powers, in this process we should also take into account the role played by producers and suppliers as well as the appropriateness of imposing restrictions upon exporters; likewise, in an effort to reflect a criterion of extensiveness, non-discrimination and equity it is vital to incorporate in the Register other categories of weapon such as weapons of mass destruction and other weapons with destabilizing characteristics. Of course, we hope that the developed countries will be the first to transmit the required information and thus set us a good example.

As to the need to revitalize the machinery and institutions in the field of disarmament, Venezuela is convinced that the Conference should maintain its character as a multilateral negotiating forum; in the name of pragmatism we should not sacrifice principles and rules that are in line with the tasks of the Conference. The effectiveness of the CD should be directed towards achieving a balance between old and new challenges. Of course, in shaping a new stage in international relations the Conference must respond to the expectations of peace and security the international community has vested in it. The other established disarmament forums such as the First Committee and the Disarmament Commission should preserve their original mandates on the basis of rationalization criteria.

(Mr. Arteaga, Venezuela)

Our delegation is of the view that the Conference, in the search for the definition of criteria relating to its membership, should, as a multilateral negotiating forum, opt for a limited expansion. We should avoid the Conference turning into a sort of General Assembly, which would hamper its effectiveness in carrying out the responsibilities or tasks assigned to it; in the definition of criteria we should prevent the creation of asymmetries in the future expansion. As regards the role that could be assumed by the Conference in overseeing multilateral disarmament treaties, this idea raises a degree of doubt because, as has already been stated, these treaties contain provision for machinery for this purpose, for instance the NPT and the IAEA safeguards system. Likewise, in raising this idea no account was taken of the limited nature of the membership of the CD; not all States parties to multilateral instruments of this nature are full members of the CD. For the rest, we agree with the role to be played by the Security Council in the enforcement of rules agreed in multilateral disarmament treaties, in conformity with the provisions of the United Nations Charter.

As we are convinced that the signature of the Convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons does not represent the end of the story for the CD, we should combine our efforts to produce multilateral treaties and specific disarmament measures in keeping with the realities of a changing world; the years of confrontation and sterile dialogue are behind us.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I thank the representative of Venezuela, Ambassador Horacio Arteaga, for his statement and for the very kind words addressed to me.

(continued in English)

I now give the floor to the representative of Sweden, Ambassador Norberg.

Mr. NORBERG (Sweden): I have asked for the floor today to make some remarks in connection with the report of the Secretary-General on "New dimensions of arms regulation and disarmament in the post-cold-war era" and the important question on the future of the Conference on Disarmament, including its composition and agenda. Much has already been said on these issues. As I can agree with many viewpoints expressed before, I will be brief.

My delegation welcomes the timely report of the Secretary-General. Sweden is in full agreement with the thrust of the observations and the ideas put forward in the report. The notions of integration and globalization should, in the new international security context, be trends generally acceptable to the international community. That seems also by and large to be the case. There also seems to be general agreement on the increased significance of the non-proliferation issues, both concerning weapons of mass destruction and conventional weapons. It is a very valuable observation that corollary issues to disarmament, such as transparency and confidence-building measures, in the new international environment gain in significance compared with traditional disarmament and arms control issues.

(Mr. Norberg, Sweden)

The various organs of the United Nations have complementary roles to play in arms control and disarmament. Basically, in the view of my delegation, the present machinery serves its purposes rather well. However, we need to improve it and in certain respects taking into account the new situation.

The General Assembly through its First Committee is a forum for normative discussions and resolutions. It is at present involved in a process of considering its working methods. An urgent task would be to restructure and streamline the agenda of the Committee.

The working methods and agenda of the United Nations Disarmament Commission (UNDC) have recently been reformed. Further steps should be taken to allow the Commission to focus more in depth on important items and submit concrete recommendations thereon. As a practical step to rationalize the functioning of the UNDC, and avoid duplication with the First Committee, the UNDC could consider suspending the practice of having a general exchange of views.

The Conference on Disarmament has beyond any doubt proved its usefulness through the completion of a chemical weapons convention. As was pointed out by my Minister for Foreign Affairs in this hall only one week ago, both the agenda and the composition of the Conference reflect the bipolar structure of the world of the cold war. The need for reform is obvious and, in the view of my delegation, an urgent matter.

On the part of my delegation it has earlier been suggested that the CD should be made open to all States which apply for membership. I note with satisfaction that this line of thought gradually seems to gain support. My distinguished British colleague expressed a short time ago in a plenary meeting his sympathy for this idea, and also pointed out various ways to achieve this without damaging the effectiveness of the CD, and today our distinguished German colleague also indicated sympathy for this approach. I agree with the view expressed by my British colleague that it would be ideal to solve the question of expansion first and then more in detail take up the question of the agenda. Even if the question of the agenda is also an urgent one, it would indeed be fair that new members could influence these deliberations. My delegation has earlier submitted concrete ideas about the structure of this new agenda. Let me just recall that it seems important to see to it that in the new security environment deliberations on confidence-building measures as well as regional security arrangements should also fit in with the future agenda.

It is of great value if the CD agrees on a common reply to the Chairman of the First Committee. Thus we should in this context try to concentrate on matters where there is a consensus within the CD. There is no point in enumerating different national views, as they are anyhow made known to the Secretary-General through the national replies.

(Mr. Norberg, Sweden)

The resumed session of the First Committee will be an important event, as during one week we will focus on comprehensive questions within the field of disarmament and on the disarmament machinery. Even if the CD is and should continue to be an independent body, we ought to take this opportunity to reconsider the place of the CD in the general context of handling security policy issues.

Mr. BERDENNIKOV (Russian Federation) (translated from Russian): The delegation of the Russian Federation has taken the floor today in order to welcome the adoption by the Parliament of the Republic of Belarus on 4 February of a decision concerning the ratification by Belarus of the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, START 1, including the Lisbon Protocol. Also of special importance is the decision taken by the Parliament of the Republic of Belarus concerning its accession to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons as a non-nuclear State. These decisions by the Belarusian Parliament, adopted without any reservations or conditions, undoubtedly bear witness to the great sense of responsibility with which the Republic of Belarus approaches the matter of compliance with its international obligations in the field of security and disarmament, the strengthening of the nuclear non-proliferation regime and the drastic reduction of nuclear stockpiles as a step towards their complete elimination. The Russian Federation stands ready to provide the Republic of Belarus with assistance as necessary in matters related to compliance by Belarus with its obligations under the above-mentioned agreements.

The PRESIDENT: That concludes my list of speakers for today. Does any other representative wish to take the floor at this stage? I do not see any.

May I now turn to another subject? The secretariat has circulated today the timetable of meetings to be held next week by the Conference and its subsidiary bodies. I should mention that there will be an addition to that timetable: subject to the approval of the programme of work by all the groups, the Ad Hoc Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space expects to have its first meeting on Tuesday, 16 February, at 3 p.m. If agreement is reached, we shall issue a revision of the timetable, adding that meeting. I do not see any objection.

As usual, the timetable is merely indicative and subject to change, if the need arises. In accordance with our practice, any informal open-ended consultations are not included, as they are scheduled depending on the progress achieved in our work. On that understanding, I suggest that we adopt the timetable.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT: I wish to announce that the members of the Conference will hold an informal open-ended consultation in conference room I, and I think we could productively start that immediately after this meeting, to discuss the papers circulated by the secretariat relating to our reports to

(The President)

the resumed session of the First Committee. I should like to inform you that the non-members participating in the work of the Conference are also invited to attend the consultation.

That concludes our work for today, but before I adjourn this plenary meeting, I wish to say a few words at the end of the presidency of Brazil.

The responsibility of presiding over this august body fell upon me, by alphabetical determinism, at a delicate but I may also say interesting moment. The rapid and profound changes that have occurred on the international scene in the last three years have renewed the hopes for more effective action by the United Nations in the field of disarmament and international security. At the same time, the CD, after the successful conclusion of the negotiations on a chemical weapons Convention, is called to answer to the expectations of the international community in relation to other issues of the disarmament agenda. It also has to deal with pressures for reform and show its capacity to adapt to changing world circumstances without in any way compromising its identity and effectiveness, as the sole negotiating body for multilateral disarmament.

I am pleased to see that in these four weeks it was possible to create conditions to start working on substantive issues, and to make considerable progress in organizational matters. Productive work has also been done concerning the comments requested from the CD on the United Nations Secretary-General's report on "New dimensions of arms regulation and disarmament in the post-cold-war era", as well as on questions relating to its functioning, agenda and membership. I hope I will be able to hand to my successor, if not fully agreed drafts, at least a basis for these reports.

The credit for whatever results were achieved must of course go to the members of the CD. Without the good will and sense of purpose displayed by all delegations, little or no progress would have been possible. And my successor, as well as his own successor in the presidency, might still be faced, as in previous years, with the task of discussing the setting up of groups and the establishment of mandates. That would have been very detrimental to our work and to the image of the CD itself. I am glad we were able to avoid this less promising scenario. My task as President was made significantly lighter in view of the work done by my predecessor Ambassador Servais of Belgium, to whom I wish to pay tribute here. I must also thank the Secretary-General of the Conference, Ambassador Berasategui, whose well-known skills and indefatigable disposition to work creatively contributed to solve many problems. I also thank other members of the staff who, behind the curtains, helped Ambassador Berasategui and indirectly myself.

I hope this has been a good and smooth start. I wish luck to my successor, Mr. Deyanov of Bulgaria. I am certain that with your cooperation the CD will witness further progress in the substantive work which has already begun.

The next plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament will be held on Thursday, 18 February, at 10 a.m.

The meeting rose at 12.10 p.m.